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Abstract 
Dzhaparidze, G., A generalized notion of weak interpretability and the corresponding modal 
logic, Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 61 (1993) 113-160. 
A tree Tr(T,, , T,,) of theories T,, . , T, is called tolerant, if there are consistent 
extensions T:, , Ti of T,, , T,, where each T,? interprets its successors in the tree 
Tr(T:, , TT). We consider a propositional language with the following modal formation 
rule: if Tr is a (finite) tree of formulas, then OTr is a formula, and axiomatically define in this 
language the decidable logics TLR and TLRw. It is proved that TLR (resp. TLRw) yields 
exactly the schemata of PA-provable (resp. true) sentences, if OTr(A,, , A,) is understood 
as (a formalization of) “Tr(PA + A,, . , PA + A,) is tolerant”. In fact, TLR axiomatizes a 
considerable fragment of provability logic with quantifiers over P,-sentences, and many 
relations that have been studied in the literature can be expressed in terms of tolerance. We 
introduce and study two more relations between theories: cointerpretability and cotolerance 
which are, in a sense, dual to interpretability and tolerance. Cointerpretability is a 
characterization of Z,-conservativity for essentially reflexive theories in terms of translations. 
Introduction 
In [15] the notion of relative’ interpretability between theories was introduced. 
Intuitively, “T interprets S” means that the language of S can be translated into 
the language of T in such a way that T proves the translation of every theorem of 
S. In [4, 171 a model theory of the propositional logic ILM with the binary 
modality D was studied. As was proved later, ILM is the complete logic of 
interpretability over PA (Peano arithmetic). That is, ILM yields exactly the 
’ Henceforth we usually omit the word ‘relative(ly)‘. 
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schemata of PA-provable arithmetical sentences, if we understand A D B as a 
formalization of the assertion “PA + A interprets PA + B”. This result, the 
arithmetical completeness of ILM, was independently obtained by Berarducci [2] 
and Shavrukov [13]. 
Another interesting binary relation between theories, weak interpretability, 
was introduced in [15]: S is weakly interpretable in T, if S is interpretable in some 
consistent extension of T in the language of T. Intuitively, “T weakly interprets 
S” means that the language of S can be translated into the language of Tin such a 
way that the translations of theorems of S are consistent with T. 
Unlike interpretability, weak interpretability does not naturally have to be 
restricted to the binary case, and we introduce the notion of tolerance that is a 
natural generalization of that of weak interpretability: 
A tree Tr(T,, . . . , T,,) of theories Ti, . . . , T, is said to be tolerant, if there are 
consistent extensions T:, . . . , T,+ of T,, . . . , T, such that each TT interprets its 
successors in the tree Tr(T:, . . . , Tz). 
Consider a particular example. Let Tr = Tr(T, R, S, T) be the tree of theories 
displayed in Fig. 1. Then the intuitive gist of the statement “Tr is tolerant” is the 
following: (the theorems of) the theories Q and T can be translated into the 
language of S and added to S; the augmented S and the theory R can be 
translated into the language of T and added to T; moving downward in this way, 
we obtain a kind of ‘avalanche’ of information contained in these theories. The 
tolerance of Tr means that this ‘avalanche’ is consistent (i.e., there is a way of 
translating that leads to the consistent ‘avalanche’). 
In Section 4 we axiomatically define the decidable modal propositional logic 
TLR with the following modal formation rule: if Tr is a (finite) tree of formulas, 
then OTr is a formula. It is proved that TLR is sound (Section 7) and complete 
(Section 8) as the logic of tolerance over PA. That is, TLR yields exactly the 
schemata of PA-provable arithmetical sentences if OTr(AI, . . . , A,) is under- 
stood as a formalization of the assertion “Tr(PA + A 1, . . . , PA + A,) is toler- 
ant”. In Section 9 we define the decidable extension TLRw of TLR which yields 
exactly the schemata of true arithmetical sentences. 
De Jongh and Veltman [4] introduced a Kripke-like semantics for ILM and 
proved the soundness and the completeness of ILM with respect to it. Visser [17] 
Fig. 1. 
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simplified this semantics and proved the corresponding soundness and complete- 
ness theorems. We call the simplified de Jongh’s and Veltman’s models ‘Visser 
models’. As we show in Section 4, TLR, too, is sound and complete with respect 
to Visser models (of course, with a different kind of forcing relation). 
Each of Berarducci’s and Shavrukov’s proofs of the arithmetical completeness 
of ILM, as well as our proof of the arithmetical completeness of TLR, consists in 
an ‘embedding’ of Visser models into arithmetic by means of a Solovay-like [14] 
function. In fact any one of the three versions of this function, given in [2, 131 and 
in the present paper, can be used to prove the arithmetical completeness of both 
ILM and TLR. 
Some more background information on the present work. 
In [S] the decidable propositional logic HGL (‘the logic of arithmetical 
hierarchy’) with infinitely many unary modalities: Cl, Z,, ZT, &, Zc, . . . was 
introduced. There the arithmetical completeness of HGL was proved, when q A 
is understood as “A is provable (in PA)“, &,A as “A is (PA-equivalent to) a 
Zn,-sentence”, and lY:A as “A is (PA-equivalent to) a Boolean combination of 
Zn-sentences”. 
Ignatiev [lo] strengthened the results of [5] concerning the fragment of the 
logic of arithmetical hierarchy obtained by restricting its language to the two 
modalities 0 and .Zi. Namely, he changed the unary modality Z1 for the more 
general binary modality ++, interpreting A + B as “there is a ,X,-sentence F such 
that PAt(A-+F) A (F + B)” (for comparison: 2,A is understood as “there is a 
Z’,-sentence F such that PA t- (A -+ F) A (F+ A)"); there the arithmetically 
complete decidable logic ELH was constructed, called ‘the logic of ,Z’,- 
interpolability’. 
The author of the logic of ,Y,-interpolability did not suspect that in the language 
of ELH, a metarelation that seems much more interesting than _Z,- 
interpolability,was expressible. Only later, in [6], it was shown that the relation 
“there is a Z,-sentence F such that PA k (A -+ F) A (F-, B)” is equivalent to 
“PA +lB is not weakly interpretable in PA + A”. It means that Ignatiev’s logic 
can be regarded as the logic of the binary relation of weak interpretability (in its 
original, non-generalized version) over PA. 
In [6] I introduced the decidable logic TOL with the modality 0; the arity of 0 
is not fixed: if A,, . . . , A,, are formulas, then O(A,, . . . , A,) is a formula, too. 
There the arithmetical completeness of TOL was proved, when O(A1, . . . , A,) is 
understood as “LTr(PA + A,, . . . , PA + A,) is tolerant”, where LTr(PA + 
Ai,. . . , PA + A,) is the linear tree PA + A, < * . . <PA + A,. We see that the 
language of TOL is a fragment of TLR; on the other hand, Ignatiev’s modality 
A ++ B can be expressed in the language of TLR by lt)(A, -IB); it means that the 
language of ELH is a fragment of the language of TOL. In fact in each case the 
inclusion of the languages is essentially proper. 
In [6], TOL was called ‘the logic of tolerance’. But now we prefer to call TOL 
‘the logic of linear tolerance’, maintaining the name ‘the logic of tolerance’ for 
TLR. 
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Fig. 2. 
The arrows in Fig. 2 that summarizes the above-said, demonstrate the ‘more 
general’-relation between logics GL (the logic of provability, with the modality •i 
for the provability predicate), ILM, the Cl, Z,-fragment of HGL (denoted by 
HGL-), ELH, TOL and TLR; in parentheses the names of the authors of the 
corresponding arithmetical completeness theorems are indicated. 
The logics HGL-, ELH and TOL are described in Appendix A. 
In Section 10 we show that the language of TLR is strong enough to express 
any n-ary metarelation of the type “for all ,X,-sentences F,, . . . , Fk there are 
_Z,-sentences Fk+l, . . . , F, such that PA t BY, where Bl is any Boolean 
combination of F,, . . . , F,, Al, . . . , A,. It means that TLR axiomatizes a 
considerable fragment of provability logic with quantifiers over Z,-propositions. 
The strength of the language of TOL is not enough for this. Note that 
,Y,-interpolability is a typical example of a metarelation of the above-mentioned 
type (with k = 0, m = 1 and n = 2). 
In Section 3 we introduce two more relations between theories called 
‘cointerpretability’ and ‘cotolerance’. They are in a sense dual to the inter- 
pretability and tolerance relations. 
Intuitively, “S is cointerpretable in T” means that the language of T can be 
translated into the language of S in such a way that T proves every formula the 
translation of which is provable in S. 
And “Tr is cotolerant”, where Tr is determined by Fig. 1, means the following. 
We translate the language of S into the languages of Q and T and then add to S 
every sentence the Q-translation of which is provable in Q or the T-translation of 
which is provable in T; denote the augmented S by S+. Then we translate the 
language of T into the languages of R and S and add to T every sentence the 
R-translation of which is provable in R or the S-translation of which is provable in 
S+; denote the augmented T by T+. If there is a way of doing translations that 
leads to the consistent T+, then (and only then) we say that Tr is cotolerant. 
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We show in Appendix B that for essentially reflexive theories cointerpretability 
and XI-conservativity are the same. This is a solution of the problem of finding a 
characterization of .Z,-conservativity in terms of translations, which was left open 
in [S] as a presumably difficult question. 
The logic of cointerpretability is not studied at all, and this task seems to be 
much more difficult than studying the logic of interpretability. As for cotolerance, 
we show in Sections 2 and 3 that this relation is expressible in terms of linear 
tolerance, i.e., tolerance of linear trees; it means that TOL can be regarded as 
the logic of cotolerance (but not as the logic of the nonrestricted relation of 
tolerance) over PA. 
1. Trees 
Dejinitions, notation and terminology 
1.1. A finite irreflexive tree is a pair [m, i], where M is a finite nonempty set, < 
is a transitive irreflexive relation on Ju, and the following conditions are satisfied: 
(a) thereisdEMsuchthatforanyd#aEM, d<a; 
(b) for all a, b, c E M, if a <c and b < c, then either a < b or a = b or b CC. 
Since no other kinds of trees will be considered in this paper, we shall usually 
omit the words ‘finite irreflexive’ and say simply ‘a tree’. 
1.2. Let [M, <] be a tree. Then: 
1. a is said to be the immediate predecessor of b in [M, <I, iff a i B and there 
is no c with a x c 4 b. And b is said to be an immediate successor of a in [M, ~1, 
iff a is the immediate predecessor of b in [M, <I. 
2. We say that n is the depth of a E M in [M, <I, iff there are bl, . . . , 6, with 
aXb,<*. . <b, and there are no c,, . . . , c,+~ with a <cl < + . . -c c,+~; if there 
is no b with a <b, then the depth of a in [M, K] is 0. 
3. We say that n is the height of a EM in [M, <I, iff there are bl, . . . , 6, with 
b,<... <b, <a and there are no cr, . . . , c,+~ with c, < * . . < c,+l <a; if there 
is no b with b <a, then the height of a in [M, <] is 0. 
4. a<bmeansthata<bor(a,bEMand)a=b. 
5. {a<} (where a EM) denotes the set {b: a <b}. 
Note that the above signs < and < are, in fact, metavariables for relations. The 
signs < and c are reserved for the usual relations ‘is less than’ and ‘is less than or 
equal to’ on natural numbers. 
1.3. We say that (Y is an evaluator of a tree [m, <] (or, simply, of M), iff (Y is a 
function : M+- S for some set S; when we want to indicate that S is the range of 
ff, we say “a is an evaluator of [M, <] (or, of M) in S”. Usually, S will be a set 
of theories, formulas or ‘possible worlds’. 
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1.4. An evaluated tree is a triple [M, <, a], where [M, <] is a tree and (Y is its 
evaluator; when we want to indicate that S is the range of (Y, we say “[M, <, (u] is 
a tree of elements of S”; if, e.g., S is the set of theories, we can simply say 
“[M, <=, (Y] is a tree of theories”. 
1.5. Let a be an evaluator of some tree [M, <I, and let d E M. Then (Y =d/3 
means that p is an evaluator of M such that for each d # a E M, m(a) = B(a). 
1.6. The signs G and c are used in their usual meaning for “is a subset” and “is a 
proper subset” relations between sets. Besides, we use these signs to denote 
relations between trees and evaluated trees: 
[M’, <‘] G [M, <] (resp. [M’, i’] c [M, i]) means that M’ EM (resp. M’ c 
M) and <’ is the restriction of 4 to M’; 
[M’, <I, LY’]c[M, <, LY] (resp. [M’, <‘, a?] c[M, i, a]) means that [M’, 
<‘I c_ [M, -c] (resp. [M’, <‘I c [M, -x) and (Y’ is the evaluator of M’ such that 
c?(a) = a(a) for each a E M’. 
1.7. Let [M, <, a~] be an evaluated tree. Then: 
1. We say that a tree [M’, <‘I (resp. an evaluated tree [M’, <I, CL’]) is an initial 
part of [M, <] (resp. of [M, -c, a]), iff [M’, <‘I c [M, <] (resp. [M’, -c’, a?]~ 
[M, <, LY]) and for all a, b EM, if a -K b and b EM’, then a E M’. 
2. For any d EM, [M, iId and [M, <, (~1~ denote [M’, -c’] and [M’, <‘, CC], 
respectively, where M’ = {d<}, and <’ and a’ are the restrictions of < and a to 
M’. 
1.8. Suppose [M, <, a] and [M’, -c’, a’] are evaluated trees. Then: 
We write [M, -c] zi[M’, ~‘1, iff i is an isomorphism between [m, <] and 
[M’,<‘],i.e.,iisa1-1function:M~M’suchthatforalla,b~M,a4b~~ia<’ 
ib. 
[M, <, al =i W’, <‘, a’] means that [M, <] zi [M’, ~‘1 and for each a EM, 
a(a) = a’(ia). 
[M, <] = [M’, <‘I (resp. [M, <, LY] = [M’, <I, a’]) means that [M, <] zi 
[M’, <‘I (resp. [M, <, cu] =i [M’, <‘, (~‘1) for some i. 
Clearly = is an equivalence relation. 
1.9. Sometimes we denote trees and evaluated trees shortly by [Tr], 
[Tr’], [Tr,], . . . . 
1. If [Tr] is a tree or an evaluated tree, then (Tr) denotes the =-equivalence 
class of [Tr], i.e., the set {[Tr’]: [Tr’] = [Tr]}; instead of the short notation 
‘(Tr)‘, we can use the complete form (M, <) (when [Tr] = [M, 41) or (M, <, a) 
(when [Tr] = [M, <, a]). 
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2. (Tr,) E (Tr,) means that [Tr;] E [Tr;] for some (Tr;) = (Tr,) and (Tr;) = 
(TrJ; similarly for c. 
3. Suppose [Tr] is a tree [M, -c] or an evaluated tree [M, -c, cy], and d E M. 
Then (7’r)d denotes the --equivalence class {[Tr’]: [Tr’] = [Trld} (see 1.7.2). 
1.10. Suppose [M, <, CY] is an evaluated tree, and [Tr] is [M, <] or [M, X, (~1. 
Then ROOT[Tr] (as well as ROOT[M, -c] and ROOT[M, 4, CX]) denotes the 
very d E M, for which 1.1(a) holds. 
1.11. Suppose [Tr] = [M, <, a] is an evaluated tree. Then root(Tr) (as well as 
root(M, <, a)) denotes a(ROOT[Tr]). 
Note that if [Tr] and [Tr’] are =-equivalent evaluated trees, then root( Tr) = 
root( Tr’), but possibly ROOT[ Tr] # ROOT[ 7'r ‘I. 
1.12. Suppose [Tr,] = [M,, x1, al], [TrJ = [M,, + CYJ are evaluated trees with 
M, f~ I& = 0, and d E M,. Then [Tr,] +d [7’r2] is the evaluated tree [M, <, a], 
where: 
(a) M = M, U M,; 
(b) < = <I U -$ U {(a, b): a <, d and b E M,}; 
(c) for any a E Ml, a(a) = al(a) and for any a E M2, (U(U) = a$~). 
1.13. Suppose [Tr,] = [M,, x1, cur], [Tr2] = [M,, $, a21 are evaluated trees (pos- 
sibly M, rl M2 # 0) and d E M,. Then (Tr,) +d (TrJ is the =-equivalence class of 
[Tr,] +d [M, <, a], where [M, <, a] is an arbitrary evaluated tree --equivalent 
to [Tr2] with MI fl M = 0. 
1.14. Let [ Tr2] and [ Tr,] = [M, , -c~, cu,] be evaluated trees. We say that ( Tr2) is a 
duplicate of (Tr,), iff (7’~~) = (7’rJ +d (Tr,), for some d E M, . 
1.15. A tree [M, <] or an evaluated tree [M, -c, a] is said to be linear, iff -C is 
linear (i.e., for all a, b EM, a <b or b X a, unless a = b). 
1.16. We use a special notation for =-equivalence classes of evaluated linear 
trees. Namely: 
Suppose [M, <, CX] is an evaluated linear tree. Obviously [M, <, a] is 
=-equivalent to [M’, <‘, CX’], where M’ = (1, . . . , n} for some II 3 1 and <’ is 
the usual relation ‘is less than’ on natural numbers (CC’ is determined uniquely). 
Then, instead of (M, -c, a), we can write (v,, . . . , u,), where u,, . . . , u, are 
the values of m’(l), . . . , d(n). 
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2. II,- and &-consistency 
2.1. Terminology. 1. By a ‘sentence’ we mean a closed first-order formula. 
2. An ‘arithmetical formula (sentence)’ means a formula (sentence) of the 
language of PA (Peano Arithmetic, cf. [3]). 
3. By a ‘theory’ we mean an arithmetically definable theory formulated in 
first-order logic with identity. Each theory is determined by a language and a set 
of sentences in this language, regarded as its extra-logical axioms. For simplicity 
we assume that the languages of the theories we consider (including PA) contain 
only a finite number of predicate constants and do not contain functional or 
individual constants. 
4. “A theory T contains a theory S” means that the language of T contains the 
language of S and T proves every theorem of S. 
5. A ‘finite extension’ of a theory T means an extension of T by one additional 
axiom in the language of T. 
6. By a ‘superarithmetical theory’ we mean a r.e. (recursively enumerable) 
theory in the language of PA and containing PA. 
7. A sequence s is said to be an ending segment of a finite sequence 
(a,, . . . , a,),iffsisemptyors=(ai,...,a,)forsomel~i~n. 
8. A finite sequence (ai, . . . , a, ) is said to be an end-extension of a sequence 
s, iff s is empty or s=(ul,...,Ui) for some 1GiSn. “s’ is a proper 
end-extension of s” means that s’ is an end-extension of s and s’ #s. 
2.2. Notation. 1. III! (resp. Zi!) is the set of all arithmetical sentences of the 
form VX F (resp. 3~ F), where F is a p.r. (primitive recursive) formula; and II1 
(resp. 2,) is the set of all arithmetical sentences that are PA-equivalent to some 
element of ni! (resp. Xi!). 
2. If M is a set of sentences in the language of a theory T, then T + M denotes 
the extension of T by M as the set of additional axioms; if M consists of only one 
sentence F, we write T + F for T + {F}. 
3. If M is a finite set of formulas, then AM (resp. V M) denotes the 
conjunction (resp. the disjunction) of all the elements of M. The empty 
conjunction (resp. disjunction) is identified with T (resp. I). 
4. If M is a set of sets, then lJ M denotes the union of the elements of M. 
5. If n is a natural number, then fi denotes the numeral for n. 
6. If F is an arithmetical formula, then IF] denotes the numeral for the Godel 
number of F (the Godel numbering is supposed to be fixed). 
2.3. Definition. Suppose [Tr] = [M, <, a] is a tree of theories and F is a set of 
sentences, where each sentence from F is common for the language of each 
theory a(u): a EM. Let p be the evaluator of M such that for each a EM, 
/3(u) = a(u) + {F: F E r and P(b) k F for some a < b}. (Note that since [M, <] is 
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a finite irreflexive tree, p is defined correctly.) Then: 
(a) root(M, -c, p) is said to be the r-avalanche on [Tr]. Observe that if 
[Tr’] = [7’r], then the r-avalanche on [Tr’] coincides with the r-avalanche on 
[Tr]. Therefore we can use ‘the r-avalanche on (Tr) as a synonym of ‘the 
r-avalanche on [ Tr]‘. 
(b) P-1 and CT 1 r are said to be r-consistent iff the r-avalanche on [Tr] is 
consistent; otherwise [ Tr] and (Tr) are r-inconsistent. 
(c) ]Trl and (T ) r are said to be r-conservative iff root(Tr) contains the 
r-avalanche on [ Tr]; if (Tr) = ( T, S) ( recall 1.16), then “S is r-conservative over 
T” is a synonym of “(Tr) is r-conservative”. 
The following lemma is an immediate consequence of Definition 2.3. 
2.4. Lemma. (PA F:) Suppose [M, i, a] is a tree of r.e. theories and r is a 
recursive set of sentences, where each sentence from r is common for the language 
of each theory a(u): a E M. Then (M, -c, cu) is r-consistent ifs there is an evaluator 
p of M such that: 
(a) for each a E M, P(u) is u consistent r.e. extension of a(u); 
(b) for all a < 6, P(b) is r-conservative over P(a)_ 
Taking into account that the sets II, and 2, are closed under conjunctions, the 
proof of the following lemma is quite simple: 
2.5. Lemma. (PA t:) A tree [M, -c, a] of superarithmetical theories is II,- (resp. 
,Y,-) inconsistent iff there are II,- (resp. Z,-) sentences F,: a E M such that 
(a) PA 1 l&OOTIM, ~1; 
(b) foreuchuEM, cu(a)tA{Fb:uib}+F,. 
2.6. Lemma. (PA I:) A linear tree (T,, . . . , T, ) of superarithmetical theories is 
III-consistent iff (G, . . . , T,) is Z,-consistent. 
Proof. Argue in PA. According to 2.5, it is enough to show that the following 
two assertions are equivalent. 
(i) there are III-sentences F,, . . . , F, such that PA t-lF, and for each 
l<iCn, L&kA{g:i<j}-+fi; 
(ii) there are .E,-sentences E,, . . . , E, such that PA tlE, and for each 
l<iGn, ~k~{Ej:i>j}+Ej. 
It is easy to check that (i) implies (ii), if we set E, = 1A (4: i < j}, and (ii) 
implies (i), if we set (6 = 1A {E,: i > j}. 0 
2.7. Definition. Let us fix 3x 0(x, y) as a formalization of the predicate “y is the 
Giidel number of a true Z,!-sentence”, with the primitive recursive 0. We 
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suppose that: 
(a) PAty #y’+l(O(x, y) A 0(x, y’)); 
(b) PAtO(x,y)~3x’>xO(x’,y); 
(c) for any Z,!-sentence F, PA k F t, 3x 0(x, IF]); 
(d) PA proves the fact (c). 
Then a number II is said to be a regular witness for a _Z,!-sentence F, iff @(ii, IF]) 
is true; and n is a regular counterwitness for a I17,!-sentence Vz E iff n is a regular 
witness for the Z,!-sentence 32 1E. 
2.8. Definition. A Zinear analog of an evaluated tree [M, <, a] is a linear 
evaluated tree [M, x’, a], where for all a, b EM, if a <b, then a i’ b. 
The results of Section 10 together with Lemma 2.5 will imply that Z,- 
consistency of trees of finite extensions of PA is expressible in terms of 
II,-consistency. But the reverse doesn’t hold: in general (unlike the situation we 
have in the linear case), 117,-consistency cannot be defined in terms of _Z,- 
consistency. A proof of this negative fact is given in Appendix A. 
The following Theorem 2.9 together with Lemma 2.6 imply something more 
than that E,-consistency is expressible in terms of I7,consistency. Namely, we 
have that ,X,-consistency is expressible in terms of II,-consistency of linear trees 
of theories: 
2.9. Theorem. (PA k:) A tree of superurithmeticul theories is Z,-consistent iff (at 
least) one of its linear analogs is .X,-consistent. 
(It follows from 2.6 and the above comments that the theorem doesn’t hold if 
‘Xi’ is replaced by ‘Iii’.) 
Proof. Argue in PA. 
Fix a tree [M, <, a] of superarithmetical theories. 
(+): Let S be the set of all the sequences s = (a,, . . . , a,) (including the 
empty sequence ( )) of elements of M such that: (1) for all i s i <j s n, ui # uj 
and (2) for all I. 1 <‘<rraandbEM, ifui<b, thenb=ujforsomei<j. 
For a sequence s = (a,, . . . a,) E S, “b E s” means that b E {a,, . . . , a,} and 
“U ES” means that U c {a,, . . . , a,}. 
We say that an element s of S is complete, iff M c s. 
Let SC be the set of all complete elements of S. 
ForeachrESCoftheform (a,,...,~, ), let <’ be the binary relation on M 
defined by: b E=‘C iff b = ai and c = aj for some i s i <j G n. So {[M, <r, a]: 
r E SC} is just the set of all linear analogs of [M, <, a]. 
Suppose every linear analog of [M, <, LY] is Z,-inconsistent. It means by 2.5 
that there are ,X,-sentences FL: r E SC, a E M such that: 
(1) PA kiF’,OoT,M, <,I (all r E SC); 
(2) a(u) k A {Fi: a 4’b) + FL (all r E SC, a E M). 
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We can suppose here that each FL is a 2, !-sentence and if r # r’ or a #a’, then 
FL# F$ and thus, PA proves that FL and FL: cannot have common regular 
witnesses (see 2.7). 
Let us define a p.r. function e : o + S as follows: 
c(O) = ( >. 
Suppose e(x) = (b,, . . . , 6,) ES. Then: 
(1) e(x + 1) =s, ifs = (a, b,, . . . , b,) E S and for each r E SC such that s is an 
ending segment of r, Fi has a <X regular witness; 
(2) otherwise, e(x + 1) = e(x). 
It is easy to see that: 
2.9.1. (PA 1:) lfe(x) =s, then, f or all y > x, s is an ending segment of e(y). 
It follows from 2.9.1 that: 
2.9.2. (PA 1:) e has a limit. 
Let Lim denote this limit. 
2.9.3. For each a E M, a(a) proves the following: Suppose e(x) = (b,, . . . , b,), 
rESCand (a, b,, . . . , b,) is an ending segment of r. Then FL is true. 
Proof. Argue in &(a). Assume the conditions of 2.9.3. 
Let us consider any c EM with a <‘c. We have c = bj for some 1 pi in. 
Therefore, since e(x) = ( bI, . . . , b,), there is y <X such that e(y) # e(y + 1) = 
(bi, . . . , b,). By the definition of e (taking into account that ( bi, . . . , b,), too, 
is an ending segment of r), this is possible only if Fg has a my regular witness. 
Thus, for all a <‘c, FE is true. Then, by (2), FL is true. Cl 
2.9.4. For all a E M and s E S such that a $ s and {b: a < b} c s, a(a) proves that 
s # Lim. 
Proof. Assume s = ( bl, . . . , b,)ES, aEM, a$s and {b:a<b}Es. Observe 
that then (a, bl, . . . , 6,) ES. 
Argue in a(a). Suppose s = Lim. Fix a number x such that e(y) =s for all 
y ax. By 2.9.3, for each r E SC such that (a, b,, . . , b,) is an ending segment of 
r, FL is true; it means that there is z ax for which every such FL has a 6z regular 
witness (for, by 2.7(b), every true Z,!-sentence has arbitrary large regular 
witnesses). Then, by the definition of e, e(z + 1) = (a, b,, . . . , 6,) fs, a 
contradiction. 0 
For each a EM, let E, be a Z,-formalization of the assertion “there is x such 
that a E e(x)“. 
2.9.5. For each a EM, a(a) 1 r\{Eb: a < b} + E,. 
Proof. Argue in a(a). Suppose r\{Eh: a <b}. Then if follows easily from 
2.9.1-2 that {b: a < 6) c Lim, whence, by 2.9.4, a E Lim. And a E Lim clearly 
implies E,. Cl 
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2.9.6. PA k-ERooT,M, <,. 
Proof. Let d = ROOT[M, <I. Argue in PA. Suppose e(x) = s and d ES. Clearly 
d E s implies that s E SC and s has the form (d, bl, . . . , b,). We may suppose 
that e(x - 1) = (b,, . . . , b,). Then, according to the definition of e, there is a 
G(x - 1) regular witness for F” d. But, according to (l), this is impossible because 
F> is false. 0 
Now, 2.9.5-6 imply by 2.5 that [M, i, a] is Z,-inconsistent. 2.9(+) is thus 
proved. 
(+): Suppose [M, <, a] is .Z,-inconsistent, i.e., by 2.5, there are Z,-sentences 
F,: a EM such that: (1) PAklFRooTtM, <I and (2) for each a EM, 
a@)kl\{Fb:a<b}+FO. Consider an arbitrary linear analog [M, <‘, a] of 
[M, <, (u]. Observe that ROOT[M, <‘I= ROOT[M, ~1; and, since a <b implies 
u <’ b, the above two conditions with < replaced by <’ continue to be satisfied. It 
means by 2.5 that [M, <‘, a] is ,Z,-inconsistent. 0 
3. What is so interesting about ZI,- and &-consistency? 
3.1. Definition. Let L and L’ be first-order languages (without functional 
symbols). A translation from L into L’ is a function t which assigns to each 
formula F of L a formula tF of L’ with exactly the same free variables, such that 
for some fixed formula 6(x) (with only x free), we have: 
1. t(Vx F) is Vx (6(x)* tF) and t(3x F) is 3x (6(x) A tF); 
2. t commutes with the operation of substitution of free variables: if 
tF(xl, . . . , x,) is F’(xl, . . . ,x,), then tF(yl, . . . , y,J is F’(y,, . . . , y,J; 
3. t commutes with Boolean connectives; 
4. t(x=y) isx=y.* 
3.2. Notation. Suppose t is a translation from the language of a theory S into the 
language of a theory T. Then: 
(a) t(S) denotes th e set of all sentences tF with S t F; 
(b) t-‘(T) denotes the set of all sentences F with T t tF. 
3.3. Definition. Let T and S be theories. 
(a) S is interpretable in T iff there is a translation t from the language of S into 
the language of T such that T proves every F E t(S). 
(b) S is cointerpretable in T iff there is a translation t from the language of T 
into the language of S such that T proves every F E t-‘(s). 
*In fact all the lemmas and theorems of the present section will continue to hold if we take 
Definition 3.1 without clause 4, or if we demand the formula 6(x) to be ‘vacuous’, e.g. x = Y. 
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3.4. Definition. Let [Tr] = [m, -K, a] be a tree of theories. 
(a) [ 7’rJ is tolerant, iff for each a -C b there is a translation tba from the language 
of a(b) into the language of a(a) such that root(M, -c, a’) is consistent, where 
for each a EM, a’(a) = a(a) + U{tbU~‘(b): a i b}. 
(b) [Tr] is cotolerunt, iff for each a <b there is a translation taah from the 
language of (U(U) into the language of cu(b) such that root(M, <, LY’) is consistent, 
where for each a E M, a’(u) = CY(U) + U{t,-da’(b): a -C b}. 
The following lemma is in fact an immediate consequence of Definitions 3.3 
and 3.4. 
3.5. Lemma. (PA t:) A tree [M, -c, a] of r.e. theories is tolerant (resp. 
cotolerunt) iff there is an evaluator CY’ of M such that for each a E M, LX’(U) is 
a consistent r.e. extension of m(u) and for each a -K 6, a’(b) is interpretable (resp. 
cointerpretable) in a’(u). 
The clause (a) of the following Theorem 3.6 is due to Hajek [9] (see also in 
[8]). The proof uses Orey’s [12] ( see also [7]) theorem, according to which S is 
interpretable in T iff T proves the consistency of every finite subtheory of S. 
As for the clause (b), up to now it has not been known. We give a proof of it in 
Appendix B. 
3.6. Theorem. (PA 1:) For all superarithmetical theories T and S, 
(a) S is interpretable in Tiff S is III-conservative over T; 
(b) S is cointerpretuble in T iff S is 2,-conservative over T. 
It follows immediately from 2.4, 3.5 and 3.6 that: 
3.7. Theorem. (PA 1:) A tree of superarithmetical theories is tolerant (resp. 
cotolerunt) iff it is II,- (resp. E,-) consistent. 
3.8. Remark. Non-tolerance can be regarded as a generalization of the notion of 
inconsistency and hence of provability. The following argument shows that in 
certain cases this approach enables us to prove new ‘truths’ which weren’t 
derivable in initial theories. 
Suppose [Tr] = [M, -c, a] is a tree of theories and, for each u EM, h(u) is the 
language of a(a) and ~(a) is a model of a(a) (all axioms of Q(U) are true in 
p(a)). Suppose also that for all a -=c b, there is a translation tba from A(b) into n(u) 
preserving the truth, i.e., for any sentence F E A(b), p(b) k F iff ~(a) & thuF. It is 
possible that we only believe in the existence of such translations, but cannot 
build them constructively. 
For d EM, say that a sentence F of /I(d) is ([Tr], d)-provable, iff [M, <, a’] 
is not tolerant, where LY’ is the evaluator of M such that (Y’ =d cx (recall 1.5) and 
a’(d) = a(d) + 1F. In general, ([ Tr], d)-p rovability is weaker than the predicate 
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of (usual) provability in o(d). Nevertheless, as is easy to see, all ([Tr], d)- 
provable sentences are true in p(d). This is a nice fact because, in many cases (at 
least, when each a(a) is a superarithmetical theory), the set of ([ Tr], d)-provable 
sentences is recursively enumerable. 
The above approach can prove to be useful in case of non-cotolerance, too. 
4. Logic TLR 
4.1. Description of the language of Logic TLR 
4.1.1. Let us fix an r.e. list 
[Ml, -+I,. . . , [Ml, -G,], [M2, -G], . . . , [M2, +J, [M3, (:I,. . . , [M3, -$], . . . 
of trees such that: 
(1) for each n 3 1, M” = (1, . . . , n}; 
(2) for each 1 =S n and 1 s i <j 6 k,, not [M”, -=c;] q [M”, ~71; 
(3) for any tree [M, -c] there are n 2 1 and i with 1 G i G k, such that 
[M, <I = [M”, <1] ( namely, n is the cardinality of M). 
Notice that the above-mentioned list is in fact a complete and non-redundant 
enumeration of all =-equivalence classes of trees, if we change the square 
brackets [a . -1 to (a - -). 
One can easily calculate that, e.g., k, = k2 = 1, k, = 2, k4 = 3, k, = 5. 
4.1.2. The alphabet of the propositional polymodal logic TLR consists of: 
- propositional letters: p,, p2, p3, . . . ; 
- Boolean connectives including T and I ; 
- modal operators: O:, . . . , O:,, O:, . . . , O&, O:, . . . , Oi3, . . . ; the arity of 
each operator 01 is just n; 
- technical signs: the usual brackets and the comma. 
4.1.3. Formulas of the language of TLR will be called ‘TLR-formulas’. The class 
of TLR-formulas is defined as the smallest one such that: 
(1) propositional letters are TLR-formulas; 
(2) if A and B are TLR-formulas, then l(A), (A)-, (B) and the other Boolean 
combinations of A and B (including the ‘empty’ ones I and T) are TLR- 
formulas; 
(3) for each n>l and lsick,, if AI,. . . , A, are TLR-formulas, then 
&‘(A,, . . . , A,) is a TLR-formula. 
4.1.4. For each TLR-formula of the form @(A,, . . . , A,), let g(@(A,, . . . , A,)) = 
(M”, ~1, a), where a, is the evaluator of M” such that for each i E M”, a(j) = 
Aj. It is easy to see that g establishes a l-l correspondence between the set of all 
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TLR-formulas of the form ();(A,, . . . , A,) and the set of all =-equivalence 
classes of the trees of TLR-formulas. 
4.1.X Suppose D denotes an =-equivalence class of some tree of TLR-formulas 
(usually, D looks like (Tr), (M, <, CY) or (A,, . . . , A,,,), recall 1.9.1 and 1.16). 
Then, taking 4.1.4 into account, we’ll use the expression 00 to denote the very 
TLR-formula @(A,, . . . , A,), for which D = g(O?(A,, . . . , A,)). 
4.2. Definition (of Logic TLR). The axioms of TLR are all TLR-formulas that 
are tautologies or have one of the following forms: 
1. O(M, <, a)-, OW, <, al) v O(M, <, CY,), where for some d EM, we have 
a,(d) = a(d) A 1A, az(d) =A and a, =d LY=~(Y~ (recall 1.5); 
2. OG++(A A%A)); 
3. O(A, O(W)-+ O(A A OW)); 
4. 0WJ-t O(%), h w ere one of the following holds: 
(a) (7’~) c (Tr,) (recall 1.9.2); 
(b) (Tr,) is a duplicate of (Tr,) (recall 1.14); 
(c) WI] = [MI, <I, a,], there is d E MI with m,(d) =A A O(Tr) and (TP$ = 
(Tr,) +d(Tr) (recall 1.13). 
The rules of inference of TLR are: 
5. Modus ponens; 
6. k1A + W)(A). 
4.3. Lemma. TLR t O(M, -c, aI)-+ O(M, -c:, mz), if there is CY E M such that 
a, =a a2 and TLR 1 al(u) --, cu&). 
Proof. Suppose TLR t a,(a)-+ Q(U), i.e., TLR t~(cwI(u) A ~cY~(u)). Then, by 
4.2.6, 
(1) TLR F +( a,(u) A ~cQ(u)). 
Let cu, =a LY~ (=a CYJ and Q(U) = cur(u) A ~(Y~(u). 
(2) TLR t O(M, x, a,)--, 0W.C <t 4 v OWf, i> 4 (4.2.1); 
(3) TLRWK <> ~J-+o(a,(a)~~(a)) (4.2.4a); 
TLR t OW, <t a~)-, OW, <, 4 
from (l), (2), (3) by propositional logic. q 
4.4. Lemma. TLR !- O(M, <, a)-+ O(M, -c, (YJ v O(M, <, a,), if there is a E M 
such that aI =a CXY=~ cu, and a(u) = al(u) v ~~(a). 
Proof. Assume the above conditions. 
Let CX~ =O o and c+(u) = a(u) A ia$u). We have: 
(1) TLR I- O(M, <, a)+ O(M, -c, 4 v O(M> (, 4 (4.2.1); 
(2) TLR F C&Z) -+ au,(u) (a tautology); 
(3) TLR I- O(M, <t (~3)’ O(M> K, al) (W, 4.3). 
Now, the desired condition follows from (1) and (3). 0 
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4.5. Lemma. TLRkA+ O(A) + TLRklA. 
Proof. Suppose TLRtA+O(A), i.e., TLRI--(A ,110(A)); then, by 4.2.6, 
TLRt-+A A Y)(A)), whence, by 4.2.2, TLR 110 (A) ; consequently (since 
TLRtA+ O(A)), TLRtlA. Cl 
4.6. Lemma. TLRF O(O(Tr))* O(Tr). 
Proof. 
(1) TLR t o(D)--, T A o(R) (a tautology); 
(2) TLRI- o(O(Tr))4 O(T A OVr)) ((I), 4.3). 
In fact O(T A O(D)) = O(M, -c, (u), where m = {a}, < is empty and a(a) = 
T A o(Tr). Then, by 4.2.4c, 
(3) TLR t- O(T A O(Tr)) -+ O(W, -% 4 +o W-1). 
Clearly (Tr) E ((M, i, a) +a (Tr)). Therefore, by 4.2.4a, 
(4) TLR t O(@f, -% 4 +a W))-+ OW). 
TLR t 0 (O(Tr)) 4 O(Tr) follows from (2) (3), (4) by propositional logic. Cl 
4.7. Lemma. TLRl-lO(Tr) A O(M, <, cyr)-, O(M, i, az), if there is a EM such 
that aI =a a2 and C+(U) = al(u) A io(Tr). 
Proof. Assume the above conditions. 
Let a3 =a cy, and Q(U) = O(Tr). We have: 
(1) TLRI- O(M, <, (Y,)-+ O(M, <, a~) ” O(M, s, Q) (4.2.1); 
(2) TLRk O(M, <, a&+ o(o(Tr)) (4.2.4a); 
(3) TLRt-O(OP))-,O(Tr) (4.6). 
The desired formula follows from (l), (2), (3) by propositional logic. 0 
4.8. Lemma. TLR k O(M, <, cur)+ O(M, <, a~), if d = ROOT[M, ~1, WI =d ~2 
and ct2(d) = q(d) A +(M, <, a,). 
Proof. Assume the above conditions. Let a3 and a4 be evaluators of M such that 
a3 =d aI =d a4, a3(d) = al(d) ~l(q(d) A O(M, (, q)) and a4(d) = w(d) A 
O(M, <, a,). We have: 
(I) TLRt O(M, <, LYE)-+ O(M, <, ~3) ” O(M, <> ak) (4.2.1); 
(2) TLR t a,(d) --j a2(d) (a tautology); 
(3) TLR t O(M, <, a&+ O(M, i, a*) ((2) 4.3); 
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(4) 
(5) 
(6) 
(7) 
(8) 
TLRkO(M <t ~zJ+(~,(d)) (4.2.4a); 
TLR I- a,(d)-+ O(M, <, a,) (a tautology); 
TLR~O(K@))-,O(O(M <, (~1)) ((9, 4.3); 
TLRk O(M, <, &I) ~lo(M, <t (y2)+ o(o(M <> a,)) 
(from (l), (3), (4), (6) by propositional logic); 
TLRt- O(M, <, a,) ~lo(M, <t (u2)-+ o(o(M <, %) A+(M, <, %) 
((7) 4.7). 
Now the desired condition follows from (8) by 4.5. 0 
5. TLR-models 
5.1. Definition. A l-model is a triple (W, G, k), where: 
W is a nonempty set (of ‘possible worlds’); 
G is a relation included in W x {=-equivalence classes of trees of elements of 
WI. 
k is a (‘forcing’) relation included in W x {propositional letters}, which is 
extended to complex TLR-formulas in the following unique way: for any w E W, 
(a) w k commutes with Boolean connectives; 
(b) w k O(M, <, a) iff there is an evaluator p: M* W such that w G (M, <, p) 
and for each a E M, /3(a) k u(a). 0 
A l-model (W, G, k ) is said to be a countermodel for a TLR-formula A, if not 
okAforsomew~W. 
5.2. Definition. A finite TLR-model is a l-model ( W, G, k ) with finite W and 
the following properties (for all w, u, v E W and all trees [Tr], [ Tr,], [Tr2] of 
elements of W): 
1. not wG (w); 
2. WG (u, v), vG(Tr)JuG(Tr); 
3. w G (Tr,) + w G (Tr,), if one of the following holds: 
(a) (%) s (Tr,); 
(b) (Z’r,) is a duplicate of (7’rJ; 
(c) [ rr,] = [MI, -c,, a,], there is d E M, with au,(d) G (Tr) for some tree [ Tr] 
of elements of W such that (TQ) = (7’rJ +d (Tr). 
5.3. Theorem. TLR t A ifs there is no finite TLR-countermodel for A. 
Proof. (+) follows immediately from 6.3, 7.5 and 8.1. Therefore we prove here 
only (+I). Let us fix a TLR-formula A. 
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53.1. Let Sb be the smallest set of TLR-formulas such that: 
(a) any subformula of A is contained in Sb; 
(b) if O(M, <, a) E Sb and (M’, <‘, a’) c (M, 4, cu), then O(M’, i’, (Y’) E Sb; 
(c) if B E Sb and B is not a negation, then 1B E Sb. 
Note that Sb is finite. 
We define a l-model (W, G, F) by 5.3.2, 5.3.3 and 5.3.4: 
5.3.2. W is the set of all maximal TLR-consistent subsets of Sb, i.e., w E W iff; 
(a) w s Sb (thus, every w E W is finite); 
(b) for any B such that B, TBESb, wehave BEworlBEw; 
(c) TLRXlI\w (recall 2.2.3). 
5.3.3. w G (M, -c, (Y) iff [M, <, a] is a tree of elements of w such that: 
(1) there is O(Tr’) E w such that +(~r’) E root(M, <, cr); 
(2) if +(Tr’) E w, then lO(7’r’) E root(M, -c, CX); 
(3) if iO(T ‘) r E CE a an a < b, then +Tr’) E a(b); ( ) d 
(4) for no trees [M,, 4,, ai], [M,, -$, a?] of TLR-formulas and no function 
h:M,*M do we have: 
(a) lO(M, <ir ai) E w; 
(b) [M,, x2, a21 is an initial part (recall 1.7.1) of [M,, <,, cxl]; 
(c) for all a -$ b, ha < hb; 
(d) for all a E M2, cy2(u) E cu(hu); 
(e) for all a E M2 and all a 4, b $ M2, O(M,, -K 1, cu& E @(ha) (recall 1.9.3). 
5.3.4. For any propositional letter p, w kp iff p E w. 
5.3.5. Lemma. (W, G, k ) is a finite TLR-model. 
Proof. The finiteness of W is evident. The property 5.2.1 is guaranteed by 
5.3.3.1. The property 5.2.2 easily follows from 5.3.3.3, and the property 5.2.3a 
can also be checked immediately. 
Checking of the proper0 5.2.3b. Suppose [Tr,]= [M,, <I, aI] and [Tr,] = 
[M2, +, (Y-J are trees of elements of W, and (Tr2) is a duplicate of (Tr,), i.e., for 
some dEM1, (Tr2) = (Trl) +d(Trl)d. w e may suppose that for some tree 
[Tr] = [M, <, LY] of elements of w such that M fl Ml = 0 and [Tri]d = [Tr], the 
following conditions hold: 
(I) M2=M1UM; 
(4 <,=~,U<U{(u,b):u<,dandb~M}; 
(3) for all a E Ml, cq(u) = al(u) and for all a E M, c+(u) = (Y(U). 
And suppose that not w G (Tr2). We want to show that not w G (Tr,). It is easy 
to see that if the reason for not w G (Tr2) is that one of the conditions 5.3.3.1-3 is 
not satisfied, then the same conditions fail for w G (Tr,) and so we will have not 
w G (Tr,). Now suppose that the reason for not w G (7’rJ is that the condition 
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5.3.3.4 is not satisfied, i.e., there are trees [M,, 4,, CQ], [M,, +, a~~] of 
TLR-formulas and a function h : M4+ M2 such that: 
(4) %%, -%, (~3) E w; 
(5) [M,, +, ad] is an initial part of [M,, -$, a,]; 
(6) for all a 4, b, ha =& hb; 
(7) for all a E M4, ma(u) 6 a,(ha); 
(8) for all a E M4 and all a -$ b 4 M4, 0(M3, -$, a&, E cq(hu). 
Let us fix an isomorphism i for which [ 7’rlld =i [ Tr] (recall 1.8). 
We define a function h ’ : M4 + Ml as follows: for each a E M4, h’u = ha, if 
ha E M,, and h’a = c, if (d <, c and) ha = ic E M. It is easy to check that we have: 
(9) for all a, b E M4, hu<,hb j h’u<,h’b; 
(10) for all a E M4, az(hu) = a,(h’u). 
Now, (4)-(8) together with (9) and (10) imply that not w G (M,, x1, a,) 
because 5.3.3.4 fails. 
Checking of the property 5.2.3~. Assume (Tr2) = (Tr,) +d (Tr), where [Tr] = 
[M, <, a], [Tr,] = [M,, s,, aI], [Tr,] = [M,, -$, CQ] are trees of elements of W, 
d E M, and al(d) G (Tr). W e may suppose that M, rl M = 0 and [Tr,] = [ Tr,] +d 
[Tr], i.e., the above conditions (l)-(3) are satisfied. 
And suppose not w G (Tr2). We want to show that not w G (Tr,). 
Suppose the reason for not w G (TrJ is that one of the conditions 5.3.3.1 or 
5.3.3.2 is not satisfied. Then the same condition will fail for w G (Tr,) because 
root( Tr,) = root( Try). 
Suppose the reason for not w G (Tr2) is that the condition 5.3.3.3 is not 
satisfied, i.e., for some tree [Tr’] of TLR-formulas and some (Y-C* b, lo(Tr’) E 
c~(u) and o(Tr’) E a,(b). If both a, b belong to M, then the condition 5.3.3.3 
fails for m,(d) G (Tr). This is impossible because a,(d) G (Tr). Therefore only 
the following two cases are possible: (1) both a, b belong to M, and (2) a 4, d and 
b EM. In the case 1 condition 5.3.3.3 fails for w G (Tr,) (and so not w G (Tr,)). 
Suppose now that the case 2 takes place and w G (Tr,). Then, by 5.3.3.3, 
lo(Tr’) E al(d). But then, since a,(d) G (Tr), by 5.3.3.2, lo(Tr’) E root(Tr), 
whence, by 5.3.3.3, lo(Tr’) E a(b), i.e. (since a(b) = u,(b)), lo(Tr’) E a$b). 
We have obtained a contradiction. Thus, in both the cases 1 and 2, not w G (Tr,). 
Finally, suppose the reason for not w G (TrJ is that the condition 5.3.3.4 is not 
satisfied. It means that there are trees [M,, xs, ~y3], [M,, x4, (~~1 of TLR- 
formulas and a function h : M4* M2 satisfying the above conditions (4)-(8). In 
fact M4 = MS U M6 for some MS fl Mh = 0, where for each a E MS, ha E M, and for 
eachaEM6, haEM. 
First we want to show that 
(11) 0(Tr2)c E a,(d) for all c E M6. 
132 G. Dzhaparidze 
Indeed, deny this: suppose c E M6 and O(T& 4 a,(d), i.e. (by 5.3.lb, 5.3.2b), 
-+(Tr& E &r(d). Let [7’r7] = [M,, x7, a+] = [Tr,],. Let h’ be the restriction of h 
to M,. Observe that the values of h’ belong to M. Now, one can check that the 
conditions 5.3.3.4a-e are satisfied if we take a,(d) for w, [Tr] for [Tr], [Tr& for 
[M,, <,, aI], [7’r7] for [M,, <*, a21 and h’ for h (this checking is routine and we 
skip it). It means that not a,(d) G (Tr), a contradiction. 
Let h”, i, and (Ye be the restrictions of h, 4, and od to M,, respectively. 
Observe that the values of h” belong to Ml. 
Suppose w G (Tr,). We claim that then the conditions 5.3.3.4a-e are satisfied if 
we take w for w, [Tr,] for [Tr], [TrJ for [Ml, s,, a,], [M,, <5, a51 for 
]Q +, (~~1 and h” for h (and thus, not w G (Tr,), a contradiction). 
Indeed, the condition 5.3.3.4(a) is just (4), and (b), (c), (d) we get from (5), 
(6), (7) almost automatically. Let us now check (e). Consider any a <3 b with 
a E MS and b $ Ms. We want to show that 0(M3, K~, a&, E a,(h”a). If b $ MS, 
then b 4 M4 and, by (S), O(M3, -+, a&, E a,(hu), whence (since a E MS, i.e. 
ha E Ml) 0(M3, -$, a&, E cx,(hu) = a,(h”a). And if b E M6, then, by (ll), 
O(T& E q(d). It is easy to verify that h”u <I d; therefore our supposition 
w G (Tr,) implies by 5.3.3.3 that O(T~&, E a,(h”u), as needed. 0 
5.3.6. Lemma. For any B E Sb and any w E W, w k B iff B E w. 
Proof. By induction on the complexity of B. The only nonstraightforward case is 
B = O(Tr), where [Tr] = [M, <, a]. 
(3): Suppose w k O(Tr), i.e., there is an evaluator /3: M + W such that 
w G (M, <, /3) and for each a E M, P(u) k a(u). Then, by the induction hypothe- 
sis, for each a E M, a(u) E /3(u). Now, suppose lO(7’r) E w. Define a function 
h: M-M by setting ha = a for all a EM. Then the conditions 5.3.3.4a-e are 
satisfied if we take w for w, [Tr] for [Tr], [M, <, /3] for [Ml, -$, cull, [M, <, p] 
for [M,, -$, a2] and h for h. It means that not w G (M, <, p), a contradiction. 
(e): Suppose O(Tr) E w. Let d = ROOT[M, <I. Define an evaluator 6 of M 
by: 6 =d (Y (recall 1.5) and 6(d) = a(d) A +(~r). By 4.8 we have: 
(*) TLR t o(Tr)+ (M, <, 6). 
Let H be the set of all evaluators /3 : M += W such that for each a E M, 
a(u) E /?(a) and, if a = d, lO(7’r) E /3(u) as well. 
Let for each p E H, /3’ be the evaluator of M such that for each a EM, 
B+(u) = A P(u) (th e conjunction of all the elements of /?(a)). 
And let y be the evaluator of M such that for any a EM, r(u) = 
V {P+(u): P E HI. 
Taking 5.3.2b into account, it is easy to see that for each a EM, 6(u) implies 
r(u) by propositional logic and so TLR 16(u)+ ~(a). It follows from this and (*) 
by 4.3 that 
TLR t oVr)+ O(M, (7 Y). 
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From this by 4.4 we obtain TLRt O(Tr)-+ //(C)(M, <, /3+): @ EH}, whence it 
follows: 
5.3.6.1. Lemma. TLR I- /j w-+ V {O(M, <, /3+): /3 E H}. 
5.X6.2. Lemma. For any j3 E H, if not w G (M, <, p), then 
TLR t /j w*lO(M, <, p’). 
Proof. Suppose p E H and not w G (M, <, /3). Since O(Tr) E w and +(Tr) E 
/3(d), the reason for lent w G (M, <, /3) cannot be that the conditions 5.3.3.1 is 
not satisfied. Therefore only the following three cases (i)-(iii) are possible: 
(i) The reason for not w G (M, <, /3) is that the condition 5.3.3.2 is not 
satisfied, i.e., there is lo(W) E w with O(T~‘) E P(d). Thus we have: 
(1) TLRk/j w++(Tr’); 
(2) TLRkp+(d)+O(Tr’); 
(3) TLRk O(M, <, P+)+ o@+(d)) (4.2.4a); 
(4) TLRk O(P+(4)+O(OW’)) ((9, 4.3); 
(5) TLR k O(M, <, /3+)+ o(ZY) ((3) (4) 4.6); 
(6) TLRk/\w++(M, <, /I+) ((I)? (5)). 
(ii) The reason for not w G (M, < , /3) is that the condition 5.3.3.3 is not 
satisfied, i.e., there are a < 6 and lO(Tr’) E P(a) with O(Tr’) E P(b). Thus we 
have: 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
(5) 
(6) 
(7) 
(8) 
TLRkB+(a)-,lO(W); 
TLRk/?+(b)+ o(W); 
TLRF O(M, <, P+)+ O@+(a), P+(b)) (4.2.4a); 
TLRt- O(M, <, P+)+ O(+(W, o(W) ((I), (2) (3), 4.3); 
TLRk O(~O(W, O(W)+O(~O(T~‘) A OW’)) (4.2.3); 
TLRk+O(Tr’) A o(Tr’)) (a tautology); 
TLRt-~O(lO(Tr’) A o(W)) ((6) 4.2.6); 
TLR k+(M, K, p’) ((4), (5), (7)) i.e., 
TLR k A w++(M, <, /3+). 
(iii) The reason for not w G (M, -c, p) is that the condition 5.3.3.4 is not 
satisfied, i.e., there are trees [M,, -c,, aI], [M,, 4,, ~‘~1 of TLR-formulas and a 
function h : M,+ A4 such that: 
(a) 10(M,, -G, 4 E w; 
(b) [M,, +, CQ] is an initial part of [M,, <,, a,]; 
(c) for all a -c~ b, ha =S hb; 
(d) for all a E M2, CX~(U) E P(hu); 
(e) for all a E A& and all a <, b $ M2, O(M,, -c,, a& E @(ha). 
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Thus we have: 
(1) TLRk Aw*lO(M,, <I, a,) (from (a)); 
(2) TLR 1/3’(ha) + LYE for any a E Mz (from (4); 
(3) TLR F P+(ha)+ O(M,, <I> or)b 
foranyaEM2andanya<,b$M2 (from (e)). 
Let [Tr-J = [M,, K~, cq], where M3= {ha: a EM,}, and <s and a3 are the 
restrictions of -K and p’ to M3. It is easy to verify that [TQ] is a tree of 
TLR-formulas and, clearly, [TrJ G [M, <, p’]. 
Let a: be the evaluator of M2 such that for each a EM,, &(a) = /3+(ha). 
The implication in (4) below can be deduced in TLR using several times the 
axioms 4.2.4a and 4.2.4b: 
(4) TLR F O(%)+ O(M2, <2r a:). 
Let a:+ be the evaluator of Mz such that for each a E M2, &+(a) = cyz(a) A 
/j{O(MI, <,, a&: a<, b 4 M2}. Then we have: 
(5) TLR t- O(M2, % a:)+ O(M,, x2, a:+) ((2) (3) 4.3). 
The implication in (6) below can be derived in TLR using several times the 
axioms 4.2.4c, 4.2.4a and Lemma 4.3: 
(6) TLRt O(M2, <2, a:+)+ O(M,, <I, a~). 
NOW, Cl), (4) (5) and (6) imply that TLR F // w + lO(~r~). Since (7’r3) s 
(M, <, p’), the axiom 4.2.4a gives TLR F O(M, <, p’)+ 0(7’r3). Conse- 
quently, TLR t A w +-IO(M, <, /3’). 5.3.6.2 is thus proved. 0 
Since w is TLR-consistent, 5.3.6.1-2 imply that there is p E H with w G (M, <, 
p). Recalling the definition of H, it means that for each a E M, a(a) E /3(a), 
whence, by the induction hypothesis, /3(a) k (~(a). It means that w k O(Tr). 5.3.6 
is thus proved. 0 
We can now complete the proof of Theorem 5.3(e). If TLRX A, then 
obviously there is a maximal TLR-consistent subset of Sb (i.e., an element of W) 
w such that A c$ w. Then, by 5.3.6, not w LA; taking 5.3.5 into account, it means 
that ( W, G, k ) is a finite TLR-countermodel for A. 0 
6. Visser models 
6.1. Definition. A 2-model is a tuple (V, R, S, It), where: 
V is a nonempty set (of ‘possible worlds’); 
R and S are binary relations on V; 
It is a (‘forcing’) relation included in V x {propositional letters}, which is 
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extended to complex TLR-formulas in the following unique way: for any w E V, 
(a) w It commutes with Boolean connectives; 
(b) w 11 O(M, <, a) iff there is an evaluator /3 : M+ V such that for all a E M, 
we have /3(a) It a(a), w R /3(a) and, for all a -K b, P(u) S@(b). 
A 2-model (V, R, S, k) is said to be a countermodel for a TLR-formula A, if 
not w It A for some w E V. 
6.2. Definition. AJinite Visser model3 is a 2-model (V, R, S, II) with finite V and 
the following properties: 
1. R is transitive and irreflexive; 
2. S is transitive and reflexive; 
3. RcS; 
4. w S u R ZJ + w R ZJ (all w, U, v). 
And a finite Visser model (V, R, D, II-) is said to be strengthened iff it has the 
following additional property: 
5. wRuSv+wRv (all w, U, u). 
6.3. Lemma. If there is a finite TLR-countermodel for A, then there is a finite 
strengthened Visser countermodel for A. 
Proof. The proof partially uses some technical ideas developed by Visser in [17]. 
Assume that (W, G, II-) is a finite TLR-countermodel for A. 
6.3.1. Let X be the smallest set of =-equivalence classes of trees of elements of 
W such that: 
(a) if O(M, -c, ,8) is a subformula of A and a: is an evaluator of M in W, then 
(M, <, (u) E X (we suppose here that there is at least one such subformula); 
(b) if (M, <, (u) E X and (M’, <‘, a’) G (M, <, (u), then (M’, <I, ru’) E X. 
6.3.2. Let us define a 2-model (V, R, S, It) as follows: 
V is the set of all (finite) nonempty sequences (( Tr,), . . . , (Tr,)) of elements 
of X, where for any 1 c i <n, root(TrJ G (Tri+i) or Tr,,, c Tr, (recall 1.9.2, 1.6). 
Note that V is nonempty because for each w E W, ((w)) E V. 
((Tr,), . . . , (Tr,))Rw iff w = ((Tr,), . . . , (Tr,), (Tr,,,), . . . , (Tr,)) for some 
m>nandthereisn~k<msuchthatroot(Tr,)G(Tr,+,). 
w S u iff u is an end-extension of w. 
For any propositional letter p, w Itp iff w”kp, where the notation w” is 
explained below in 6.3.3.2. 
6.3.3. Notation. 1. If w = ((Tr,), . . . , (Tr,)) E V, we use Last(w) to denote 
(Tr,). 
‘The tuples we call Visser models, have in fact only common frames (i.e., the part (V, R, S)) with 
the models for ILM studied by Visser [17]. The forcing relations are, of course, defined in different 
ways, as the languages of TLR and ILM are different. 
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2. If w E V, we use w” to denote root Last(w). 
3. If (Y is an evaluator of a set M in V, then a0 denotes the evaluator of M in W 
such that for each (Y E M, c?(a) = (a(a))‘. 
The following lemma follows easily from 5.2.3a and 5.2.3~: 
6.3.4. Lemma. Suppose ((Tr,), . . . , (Tr,)) E V, 1 s i s N and root(Tri) G (Tr). 
Then for each 1 <j c i, root(Tr,) G (Tr). 
6.3.5. Lemma. (V, R, S, IF) is a finite strengthened Visser model. 
Proof. The properties 6.2.1-5 immediately follow from the definitions of R and 
S. We only need to verify that V is finite. First notice that since W is finite, X is 
finite. Therefore, if V is infinite, there are arbitrarily long elements of V. In other 
words, for arbitrary large n, there are elements of V of the form 
((Tr,), . . . > WA . . . , W-m+,), . . . , W-d) 
with (Tr,) = (Tr,+,). W e may suppose that II is sufficiently large, namely, that 
there are no (Tr;) c * * * c (Tr,!J in X. Then it follows from the definition of V 
that there is j with m <j < m + n such that root(Tr,) G (Trj+l) and (Tr,+,J G 
(Trj+l). Then, by 5.2.3a, root(Trj) G (Tr,+,) and, by 6.3.4, root(Tr,,J G (Tr,+,), 
i.e. (as (Tr,) = (Tr,+,)), root(Tr,) G (Tr,), whence, by 5.2.3a, root(Tr,) 
G (root(Tr,)). But, according to 5.2.1, this is impossible. 0 
6.3.6. Lemma. Suppose w S u and not Last(u) E Last(w). Then w R u. 
Proof. Assume the conditions of the lemma. Assume w = ((Tr,), . . . , (Tr,)). 
Then u has the form ((Tr,), . . . , (Tr,), . . . , (Tr,)), where not (Tr,) c (Tr,). It 
follows then from the definition of V that there is n <i <m with 
root(Tri) G (Tri+,). It means by the definition of R that w R u. Cl 
6.3.7. Lemma. Zf w R u, then w” G Last(u). 
Proof. Suppose w = (( Tr,), . . . , (Tr,)) and w R u. It follows from the definitions 
of V and R that u has the form ((Tr,), . . . , (Tr,), . . , (Tr,)), where for some 
II <i <m, root(Tri) G (Tri+,) and for each i + 1 G j Cm, (Trj+l) c (Trj). Namely, 
(Tr,) G (Tri+,). And since root(Tri) G (Tri+I), we have root(Tri) G (Tr,) by 
5.2.3a; consequently, by 6.3.4, root(Tr,J G (Tr,), i.e., w” G Last(u). 0 
6.3.8. Lemma. Suppose u E W and [M, <, a] is a tree of elements of the set X 
such that: 
(a) u G root(M, <, LY) and 
(b) for all a -C b, o(b) c (~(a). 
Let p be the following evaluator of M in W: 
for all (Y E M, f?(a) = root a(a). 
Then there is a tree [M’, <I, /?‘I of elements of W such that: 
(c) u G (M’, <‘, P’); 
(4 [M, <, PI s [M’, <‘, P’l; 
(e) for each a EM, a(a) E (M’, <‘, & 
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Proof. By induction on the cardinality of M. Assume the conditions of the 
lemma. 
Suppose M consists of a single element b. Choose [M’, -c’, p’] such that 
(M’, -c’, p’) = a(b) (= root(M, <, a)) and ROOT[M’, <‘I = b. Then we trivially 
have (e), and the condition (c) is just (a). Clearly (d) is also satisfied. 
Suppose now that M consists of 22 elements. Choose then a pair b, c E M such 
that the depth of c in [M, <, LX] is 0 and b is the immediate predecessor of c in 
[M, <, a]. Let M- be M - {c}, and 4-, a-, p- be the restrictions of <, LY, /I to 
M-. The conditions (a) and (b) clearly continue to hold when M-, <-, my- stand 
for M, <, LX Hence, by the induction hypothesis, there is a tree [M*, -c*, /3*] of 
elements of W such that: 
(c-) u G (M*, <*, /3*); 
(d-) [M-, x-7 P-1 c [M*, 4*, P*]; 
(e-) for each a E M-, CC(U) c (M*, -c*, & 
We may suppose that c $ M*. Choose then [M**, <**, @**I such that 
(M**, <**, /3**) = (Y(C), M** fl M* = 0 and ROOT[M**, <**I = c. And let 
[M’, <‘, p’] = [M*, <*, /3*] +,, [M**, <**, p**]. 
We now want to show that (c), (d) and (e) are satisfied. 
(c): According to (b), a(c) c_ a(b) = a-(b); consequently, by (e-), (Y(C) s 
(M*, i*, /3*)b, i.e., 
(M**, K**, p**) c (M*, <*, /3*)b. 
Therefore, it is clear that 
(1) 
(M’, <I, fi’) = (M*, -c*, /3*) +b (M**, <**, p**) 
c (M*, <*, P*) +b (M*, <*, P*)b. 
But (M*, -x*, p*) +/, (M*, <*, p*)h is a duplicate of (M*, <*, p*) and hence, 
by (cc) and 5.2.3b, 
(2) u G (M*, <*, /3*) +h (M*, <*, /3*)b. 
Now, (c) follows from (1) and (2) by 5.2.3a. 
(d): Taking (d-) t in o account, it suffices to show that 
(3) P(c) = P’(c), 
(4) for all a E M, c<a e c<‘a, and 
(5) for all a E M, a-Cc e a<‘c. 
Observe that p’(c) = p**(c). And since c =ROOT[M**, <**I, we have 
p**(c) = root(M**, <**, p**). But (M**, <**, p**) = (Y(C) and hence 
root(M , ** <** , p**) = root a(c). 
On the other hand, by the definition of /3, root a(c) = /3(c). Consequently, (3) 
holds. 
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The (+) direction of (4) trivially holds because, according to our choice of c, 
there is no a E M with c < a. And the (e) part also holds because {a: c <’ a} = 
(M** - {c}) and (M** - {c}) II M = 0. 
Let us now check (5). Consider an arbitrary a E M. Since b is the immediate 
predecessor of c in [m, <I, we have a 4 c@u <- b; on the other hand, by (d-), 
a <- b eu <* b; finally, since [M’, s’, /3’] = [M*, <*, p*] +h [M**, <**, /3**] 
and c = ROOT[M**, <**, p**], we have a <* b eu <’ c. These three equiv- 
alences give a < c @a <’ c. 
(e): Consider an arbitrary a EM. If a = c, then a(u) is just (M’, <‘, p’)O. 
Suppose now a fc, i.e., a EM-. Then, by (e-), a(u) E (M*, <*, /3*)a. But we 
have [M*, <*, p*] s [M’, <‘, /3’] and this clearly implies that (M*, <*, fi*)a E 
(M’, i’, /zI’)~. Consequently, cu(u) E (M’, 4’, p’)a 0 
6.3.9. Definition. Let [ Tr] = [M, <, a] be a tree of elements of V such that for all 
a <b, a(u) S a(b). Then Rank(Tr) is the number of the pairs a, b E M such that 
a is the immediate predecessor of b in [M, <] and not Last(a(b)) E Last(a(u)). 
6.3.10. Lemma. Suppose w E V and [Tr] = [M, 4, a] is a tree of elements of V 
such that: 
(1) for each a E M, w R a(u); 
(2) for all a < b, a(u) S a(b). 
Then w” G (M, <, a?). 
Proof. By induction on Rank(Tr). Assume the conditions of the lemma. 
Suppose Rank(Tr) = 0. It means that 
(3) for all a < b, Last(a(b)) s Last(a(u)). 
From (1) we have w R root(Tr), whence, by 6.3.7, 
(4) w” G Last(root(Tr)). 
Let A. be the evaluator of M such that 
n(u) = Last(cu(u)) (all a EM). 
Then (4) implies 
(5) w” G root(M, <, A) 
and (3) implies 
(6) for all a < b, A(b) z A(u). 
But (5) and (6) mean that the conditions (a) and (b) of Lemma 6.3.8 are satisfied, 
when w” stands for u and 3, stands for a. Then there is a tree [M’, <‘, p’] of 
elements of W such that the conditions (c) and (d) of Lemma 6.3.8 are also 
satisfied. These two conditions imply by 5.2.3a that w” = u G (M, <, p). It means 
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that w” G (M, <, (Y’), because p = CK’. 
Suppose now Rank(7’r) > 0. Let us fix any pair c, d E M such that c is the 
immediate predecessor of d in [M, <] and not Last(cu(d)) c Last(cu(c)). Then, by 
(2) and 6.3.6, 
(7) a(c) R 44 
Let [Tr,] = [M,, x1, cull = [7’rld. It follows from (7), (2) and 6.2.5 (taking 6.3.5 
into account) that the condition (1) (as well as (2)) is satisfied when we put (u(c) 
for w and [Tr,] for [Tr]; notice also that Rank(Tr,) < Rank(7’r). Consequently, by 
the induction hypothesis, 
(8) a’(c) G (M, <,, 4’). 
Let [Tr,] = [M,, -+, az], where M2 = M - {d =G} (recall 1.25) and -$ and ay2 
are the restrictions of < and (Y to M2. Clearly Rank(&) < Rank(Tr), and (7’r2) 
(if we put it for (Tr)) satisfies the conditions of Lemma 6.3.10. Consequently, by 
the induction hypothesis, 
(9) w” G (M,, <2, 41. 
Now, (9) and (8) imply by 5.2.3~ that w” G (M, -c, cue). 0 
6.3.11. Lemma. For any subformula B of A and any w E V, w It B iff w” k B. 
Proof. By induction on the complexity of B. The only nonstraightforward case is 
B = 0(7’r), where [Tr] = [M, -c, (u]. Assume the conditions of the lemma. 
(3): Suppose w IF O( 7’r). It means that for some evaluator /3 : M - V, we have: 
(a) for all a E M, w R P(a) and, for all a -c b, /3(a) SP(b); 
(b) for all a E M, /3(a) Ik a(a). 
By 6.3.10, (a) implies that w” G (M, <, p”), and by the induction hypothesis, 
(b) implies that for each a E M, P”(a) k a(a). It means that w” b O(Tr). 
(+): Suppose w” F O(Tr). It means that for some evaluator /3 : M-, W, we 
have: 
(a) w” G (M, <, P); 
(b) for each a E M, /3(a) k a(a). 
Assume w = (( Tr,), . . . , (Tr,)). Let us define an evaluator y: M-t V by 
induction on the height of a in [M, <] (recall 1.2.3): 
(1) y(ROOT[M, iI) = ((%I, . . . , W-n), CM, <, P)); 
(2) suppose the height of a in [M, <] is m + 1, b is the immediate predecessor 
of a in [M, <] (so the height of b is m) and y(b) = ((Tr,), . . . , (Tr,), 
. . . f Wn+l+m )). Then r(a) = ((Tr,), . . . , (Tr,), . . . , (Tr,+l+,), (M, -% L-Qa). 
It follows from (a) that for each a E M, w R y(a); it is obvious also that for all 
a < 6, y(a) S y(b). On the other hand, notice that for each a EM, y”(a) = P(a), 
whence, by the induction hypothesis, (b) implies y(a) It a(a). This all means that 
w It- O(Tr). 0 
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We can now complete the proof of Lemma 6.3. Since (W, G, k ) is a 
countermodel for A, we have not w !=A for some w E W. Clearly ((w)) E V and, by 
6.3.11, not ((w)) ItA. In view of 6.3.5, it means that (V, R, S, II) is a finite 
strengthened Visser countermodel for A. •i 
6.4. Theorem. (a) TLR t A if there is no finite Visser countermodel for A. 
(b) TLR I- A iff there is no finite strengthened Visser countermodel for A. 
Proof. By 5.3(G), 6.3, 7.5, 8.1. Cl 
6.5. Corollary. TLR is decidable. 
7. The arithmetical soundness of TLR 
7.1. Notation. 1. If a is an evaluator of a set M in the set of arithmetical 
sentences, then ii denotes the evaluator of M that assigns to each a EM the 
theory PA + a(u). 
2. If D denotes the =-equivalence class of a tree [M, <, a] of arithmetical 
sentences, then CnD denotes a natural formalization (in the language of PA) of 
the assertion “(M, -c, (Y) is Di-consistent”. 
3. For an arithmetical formula F, Pr( rF1) abbreviates lCn(lF). 
4. If LY is an evaluator of a set M in the set of TLR-formulas and f is a 
function : {TLR-formulas} + {arithmetical sentences}, then fa denotes the eva- 
luator of M that assigns to each a E M the arithmetical sentence f (a(a)). 
7.2. Remark. It follows easily from 2.5 that Cn(Tr) E II1 for any tree [Tr] of 
arithmetical sentences. Note also that Cn( F) (resp. Pr( rF1)) expresses that F is a 
sentence consistent with PA (resp. provable in PA). 
In view of 3.7, Cn can also be regarded as a formalization of the predicate of 
tolerance over PA. 
7.3. Definition. A realization f is a function that assigns to each propositional 
letter p a sentence fp of PA. f is extended to complex TLR-formulas in the 
following unique way: 
(a) f commutes with Boolean connectives; 
(b) f O(M, 4, a) = Cn(M, <, fa). 
7.4. Definition. A TLR-formula A is said to be PA-valid iff PA tfA for every 
realization f. 
7.5. Lemma. If TLRkA, then A is PA-valid. 
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Proof. Modus Ponens clearly preserves PA-validity, and the rule 4.2.6 co- 
rresponds to the well-known principle PA t F +PA t Pr( rF1), so it preserves 
PA-validity, too. All tautologies are clearly PA-valid. As for the axiom 4.2.2, it is 
in fact the well-known Lob’s axiom which is PA-valid (cf. [3]). So we need now to 
check only the axioms 4.2.1, 4.2.3, 4.2.4a-c. 
In the following A is an arithmetical sentence and [M, <, (u], [M,, K,, (u,], 
[M,, +, a21 are trees of arithmetical sentences. 
Work in PA. 
Axiom 4.2.1. Assume d E M, (Y, =d (Ye =d (Y, a/,(d) = cu(d) A 1A and a,(d) = 
A. Suppose that both (M, <, (Yi) and (M, K, &) are Hi-inconsistent. We want to 
show that then (m, <, ik) is II,-inconsistent. According to 2.5, II,-inconsistency 
of (M, <, &i) and (M, <, &) means that there are FI,-sentences E,, F,: a EM 
such that: 
(1) PAt7E ROOT[M,-<] and PA~+RooT[M.+; 
(2) foreachd#aEM, PA+a(a)1A{E,:a<b}+E, 
and PA+a(a)~~{F,:a<b}-,F,; 
(3) PA+cu(d)~~At/j{E,:d<a}+E, 
and PA+At/j{F,:d-Ca}+F,. 
We may suppose here that 
(4) for each a E M, /\{E,:u<b} (resp. A{Fh:u<b}) 
is a conjunct of E, (resp. of F,). 
Let for each a <d, Hb = Fh v E,,, and for each a EM with not a <d, 
Hb = Fb A E,. Note that for each a E M, Hh E II,. It can be easily verified that 
(l)-(4) imply the following: 
(5) PA ~lH~oo~,~,<~; 
(6) for each a E M, PA + m(u) k A {Hg a < b} + H,. 
(5) and (6) imply by 2.5 that (M, -c, 5) is II,-consistent. 
Axiom 4.2.3. Suppose PA + (A A Cn(7’r)) is inconsistent. It means that 
PA + A t Tn( 7’r); and since Cn( 7’r) E FI,, we have that the ZI,-avalanche on 
(PA+A, PA+Cn(Tr)) is inconsistent, i.e., (PA+A, PA+Cn(Tr)) is 17,- 
inconsistent. 
Axiom 4.2.4a. Suppose (M,, i,, ay2) s (M,, i,, a,). Let Au, and Au, be the 
FI,-avalanches on (M, , -K~, ii,) and (M2, -$, ii/J, respectively. It is easy to see 
that consistency of Au, implies consistency of Au,; in other words, 17,- 
consistency of (M,, -c,, ii,) implies F7,-consistency of (M,, -$, &J. 
Axiom 4.2.4b. Suppose (M2, -$, (~2) is a duplicate of (Ml, i,, a,). Let Au, 
and Au, be the 17,-avalanches on (M,, <,, iii) and (M2, +, I&?), respectively. It 
is easy to see that Au, = Au,. Consequently, if (Ml, -c,, ii,) is F7i-consistent, i.e., 
Au, is consistent, then Au, is consistent, i.e., (M2, -c~, &) is FI,-consistent. 
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Axiom 4.2.4~. Assume d E MI, a,(d) = A A Cn(M, <, (Y), M1 n M = 0, M2 = 
MiUM, for each ueM1, Q(U) = q(a), for each a EM, a$u) = (Y(U), and 
<,=-c,u-cu{(u,~): u<ld and REM}. Suppose (M2, q2, &J is I’Ii- 
inconsistent. We want to show that then (MI, <, , 5,) is II,-inconsistent. By 2.5, 
fli-inconsistency of (MI, +, C,) means that there are f17,-sentences F, :a E M 
such that: 
(1) PA 1 lF~oo~pt,, -czl; 
(2) for each a E M2, PA+ (ant/\ {Fb: u<,b}-,F,. 
Observe that since (M, <, a) E (M,, -$, a2), by (2) and 2.5, we have: 
(3) for each a E M, PA 1 Cn(M, i, a), --f lPr( r~F,l ). 
Clearly we may suppose that each Fb E III! By formalizing in PA the argument 
that a false fli!-sentence cannot be consistent with PA, (3) implies: 
(4) for each a E M, PA 1 Cn(M, <, (t’),+ F,. 
Taking into account that the axiom 4.2.4a is PA-valid, we have: 
PA + Cn(m, <, a) k A {Cn(M, <, a),: a E M}; 
therefore, by (4), 
(5) PA + Cn(M, i, (t’) t A {F,: a E M}. 
Since a,(d) = A A Cn(M, <, (u), {F,: d <,a} = {F,: a E M} U {F,: d <, a} and 
a$d) = a,(d), we have that (2) and (5) imply: 
(6) PA+q(d)t-/\{F,:d-+z}-,Fd. 
Let us consider any a E MI. We have az(u) = cur(u). If a <, d, then {Fh: a <* 
b} = {Fh: u-C, b} U {Fb: b EM}; we may suppose (take (2) into account) that 
PA t- Fd-+ /\ { Fb: b E M} ; it means by (2) that 
(*) PA + @,(a) I- {Fb: a <1 b} + F,. 
If not a =C1 d, then {Fb: a -$ b} = {Fb: u <I b}, and (*) follows from (1) at once. 
Finally, if a = d, (*) is just (6). Thus we have: 
(7) for each a E MI, PA+a,(u)~/\{Fb:u-$b}--,F,. 
Now, (7) and (1) imply by 2.5 that (ml, <i, I?~) is 17,-inconsistent. 0 
8. The arithmetical completeness of TLR 
8.1. Lemma. Zf there is a finite Visser countermodel for A, then A is not PA-valid. 
Proof. Let us fix a finite Visser countermodel (V’, R’, S’, It- ‘) for A. Without 
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loss of generality we may assume that V’ = (1, . . . , e} for some e 2 1, 1 R w for 
each 1 < w c e, and not 1 It A. 
8.1.1. Let us define (V, R, S, It) by: 
V=V’U{O}; 
R and S are the extensions of R’ and S’ to V by setting 0 R w for all w E V’ and 
OSwforall wEV; 
It is the extension of It’ to V by setting for every propositional variable p, 
0 Itp e 1 IF’p. 
Note that (V, R, S, It) . 1s a finite Visser model and for all w E V’ and every 
TLR-formula B, w It B iff w It’ B. 
8.1.2. Notation. We write t, F to express that x is the Godel number of a 
PA-proof of the formula F. 
The Diagonal Lemma (cf. [3]) enables us to construct for each w E V an 
arithmetical formula L, expressing that w is the limit of the function h: o+ V, 
defined as follows: 
8.1.3. Definition. h(0) = 0 and h(x + 1) is determined by: 
1. h(x + 1) = w, if h(x) R w and kxlL,,,; 
2. otherwise, h(x + 1) = U, if h(x) Su # h(x) and there are y <x and F such 
that: 
(a) F E III! and F has a <X regular counterwitness (recall 2.7); 
(b) h(y) R h(x) and h(y) R u; 
(c) kY L,+F; 
(d) there are no u’: h(x) S u’ (possibly U’ = h(x)), y’: y’ <y, F’ satisfying the 
conditions (a)-(c), when u’, y’, F’ stand for U, y, F; 
3. otherwise, h(x + 1) = h(x). 
Note that the function h is primitive recursive. 
8.1.4. Lemma. (PA k:) 1fx my, then h(x) S h(y). 
Proof. Immediately from 6.2.2-3 and the definition of h. 0 
8.1.5. Lemma, (PA 1:) There is z such thatfor all z < z’ c z”, not h(z’) R h(z”). 
Proof. Argue in PA. Suppose, for a contradiction, that for any z there are 
z<.z’<z”with h(z’)Rh(z”); since, according to 8.1.4, h(z) S h(z’), we have by 
6.2.4 that h(z) R h(z”). Thus, for any z there is t > z with h(z) R h(t). It means 
that there is an infinite sequence w,Rw*R - . * . But this is impossible because V is 
finite and R is transitive and irreflexive. Cl 
8.1.6. Lemma. (PA I-:) Suppose w is the limit of the function h, w R u, w R v and 
u S u. Then PA + L, is Ill-conservative over PA + L,. 
Proof. Argue in PA. Assume the conditions of the lemma. We may suppose that 
v #u. Let F be any fl,!-sentence provable in PA + L,. Since w is the limit of h 
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and every provable formula has arbitrary long proofs, we have PA t, L, -+ F for 
some y with h(y) = w. Clearly PA proves that y is the Giidel number of a 
PA-proof of L, * F and (as h is primitive recursive) h(y) = w. 
Now argue in PA + L,: Suppose F is false, i.e., there exists a regular 
counterwitness z for F. Since u is the limit of h, there is x with x > y, z and 
h(x) = h(x + 1) = U. Then, according to 8.1.3.2, the only reason for h(x + 1) = u 
(#u) can be the following: there is a false n,-sentence F’ (with a <x regular 
counterwitness) such that k_+ L,-+ F’. But ‘we’ (i.e., PA + L,) know that this 
does not hold. Consequently, F is true. 0 
8.1.7. Lemma. For all w, u E V: 
(a) PA l- V {L,: w E V}. 
(b) Zf w # u, then PA tl(LW A L,). 
(c) Suppose [M, <, a] is a tree of elements of V such that for each a EM, 
w R a(a) and for ail a < b, a(a) S a(b). Let p be the evaluator of M such that for 
each a E M, @(a) = L,,,,. Then PA t L,-+ Cn(M, 4, p). 
(d) Suppose not w S u. Then PA FlCn( L,, L,). 
(e) Suppose w # 0 and not w R u. Then PA t Pr( rlL,l). 
(f) Lo is true. 
Proof. In (a)-(e) we argue in PA. 
(a): Let us fix the number z from 8.1.5. Then for each x 3 z, the transfer from 
h(x) to h(x + 1) is determined by 8.1.3.2 or 8.1.3.3. We claim that the case 
8.1.3.2 (when x 3 z) can take place at most z times (whence automatically follows 
that h has a limit and this limit is, of course, one of the elements of V). 
Indeed, deny this claim. Let then X, < * . . <x,+, be exactly the first z + 1 
numbers more or equal to z such that for each 1s i <z + 1, the transfer from 
h(q) to h(x, + 1) is determined by 8.1.3.2. Let for each 1 s i <z + 1, yj be the 
number y from 8.1.3.2 (putting x = xi). The irreflexivity of R implies z >y,; and, 
taking into account the reflexivity of S, it is easy to see that for each 1 s i s z, 
Y; >Yi+1. Thus we have obtained a contradiction: z > y, > . . . > Y~+~. 
(b): The function h clearly cannot have two limits. 
(c): Assume the conditions of 8.1.7~. Suppose that w is the limit of h and 
(M, <, p) is 17,-inconsistent, i.e., by 2.5, there are n,-sentences F,: a EM such 
that PA ~+noorlM. <l and for each a E M, &a) t A {Fh: a i b}+ F,. Let us 
show by induction on the depth in [M, -c] that for each a E M, p(a) t F,. The case 
when the depth of a in [M, <] is 0, is trivial. Suppose now that the depth of a in 
[M, <] is n + 1. Let us consider any b with a -C b. The depth of b in [M, <] is sn 
and, by the induction hypothesis, p(b) t Fb; but since a -C b, we have 
a(a) S a(b), which means by 8.1.6 that B(b) is 27i-conservative over &a); 
consequently, /?(a) t- Fh. Thus, p(a) t/j {Fb: a -C b} and, since &a) t/j {Fh: a 4 
b]-tE, we have p(a) t F, (for every a EM). Namely, root(M, K, 6) t 
F ROOT[M. <]Y and since PA t lFRoorl,+,, <I, we have PA tiroot(M, <, p). It 
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follows then easily from this by 8.1.3.1 (taking into account that w R root(M, 
<, (u)) that w cannot be the limit of h. We have obtained a contradiction. 
(d): Assume the conditions of 8.1.7d. Taking 8.1.4 into account, it is easy to 
see that PA + L, proves (the formalization of) the assertion “for all X, h(x) # w”, 
which is clearly in L7,; on the other hand, PA + L, clearly proves the negation of 
this statement. It means that (PA + L,, PA + L,) is f17,-inconsistent. 
(e): Assume the conditions of 8.1.7e. Suppose w is the limit of h. If u = w, 
then (since w # 0) there is x such that h(x) f w and h(x + 1) = w ; the transfer 
from h(x) to h(x + 1) is determined by 8.1.3.1 or 8.1.3.2; in both cases PAIlL,,, 
(in the case 8.1.3.2 because L, implies in PA a false H,!-sentence). 
Suppose now u # w. Let us fix a number z with h(z) = w. Since h is primitive 
recursive, PA proves that h(z) = w. Now argue in PA + L,: Since u is the limit of 
h, there is a number x with x 2 z such that h(x) Zu and h(x + 1) = U. Since not 
h(z) R u, by 8.1.4 and 5.2.4 we have: 
(*) for each z sy sx, not h(y) R u. 
It means that the transfer from h(x) to h(x + 1) can be determined only by 
8.1.3.2. Then (*) implies that the number y from 8.1.3.2 is less than z. That is, 
there is a false 17,!-formula F such that for some y <z, Fv L,-+ F; but ‘we’ (i.e., 
PA + L,) know that this doesn’t hold. 
Thus, arguing in PA + L,, we have obtained a contradiction. It means that 
PA klL,. 
(f): 8.1.7a implies that one of the L W: w E V, is true; if w #O, then, by 8.1.7e 
(since R is irreflexive), PA F L, + Pr( IlL,,,‘) and, therefore, L, is false. 0 
8.1.8. Let us define a realization f by setting for each propositional letter p, 
fp = v {L,: w kp}. 
8.1.9. Lemma. Suppose 0 # w E V. Then for any modal formula B: 
(a) if w II- B, then PA t L, + fB; 
(b) if not w IF B, then PA F L, -+lfB. 
Proof. Induction on the complexity of B. Assume 0 # w E V. 
Suppose B is a propositional letter p. If w Itp, then L, is a disjunct of fp and 
therefore PA t L, --+ fp. And if not w Itp, then L, is not a disjunct of fp and, by 
8.1.7b, PA E L,*lfp. 
The truth-functional cases are straightforward. 
Suppose now B = O(Tr), where [Tr] = [M, <, a]. 
(a) Suppose w It O(Tr), i.e., there is an evaluator P:M+ V such that for each 
a EM, we have: /3(a) Ik a(a), w R P(a) (so, by 8.1.1, P(a) #0) and, for all a <b, 
P(a) S p(b). Let y be th e evaluator of M such that for each a E M, y(a) = L,,,,. 
Argue in PA + L,. By the induction hypothesis, for each a EM, PA t y(a)-+ 
f&(a), i.e., the theory y(a) contains the theory s(a). It is easy to see therefore, 
that if (M, K, 7) is fl,-consistent, then (M, <, f<) is H,-consistent, too. But by 
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8.1.7c, (M, <, 7) is fl,-consistent; consequently, (M, <, fell, is Hi-consistent, 
i.e., fO(Tr) holds. 
(b) Suppose not w It O(Tr). Let E be the evaluator of M such that for each 
UEM, &(a)=V{L ,,: w R u and u It a(a)}. Notice that Lo cannot be a disjunct of 
any ~(a): a E M, because not w R 0. 
Argue in PA + L,. It follows from 8.1.7a, 8.1.7e and the induction hypothesis 
that for each a E M, PA Ffa(a) + E(U); it means that the theory fc~(a) contains 
the theory E(a). 
Suppose fO(Tr) is true, i.e., (M, c,fa) is n,-consistent; then, since &(a) 
contains E(a) for all a EM, (M, <, C) is n7,-consistent, too. By 4.4 (taking into 
account the arithmetical soundness of TLR), this is possible only if (M, <, E,) is 
I7,-consistent for some evaluator .sl of M such that for each a E M, E,(U) is a 
disjunct of E(U), i.e., ~~(a) = L, for some u with w R u and u IF m(a). Let Ed be 
the evaluator of M that assigns to each a E M the very u for which &r(a) = L,. 
Observe that since not w It O(Tr), we have not Q(U) S EZ(b) for some a <b, 
whence, by 8.1.7d, (El(a), E,(b)) is II,-inconsistent, whence, by axiom 4.2.4a 
(taking into account the arithmetical soundness of TLR), (M, <, El) is n,- 
inconsistent, a contradiction. We conclude that (m, <, F) is f17,-inconsistent, 
i.e., ifO(Tr). 0 
We can now complete the proof of Lemma 8.1. Since not 1 It A, by 8.1.9, 
PAkL,*ifA. By 8.1.7c, since OR 1, PAFLo+Cn(L,); since Lo is true, it 
follows that PAYlL,. Consequently, PA XfA. 0 
The following theorem is an immediate consequence of 7.5, 6.4a(e) and 8.1: 
8.2. Theorem. TLR t A if A is PA-valid. 
8.3. Remark, Our function h defined in 8.1.3 is similar to the Berarducci [2] 
function F. But the advantage of h is that it can be immediately employed to 
prove the completeness of ILM and TLR as the logics of 17,-conservativity and 
n7,-consistency for a wider class of ‘sufficiently rich’ base theories instead of PA, 
including finitely axiomatized ones. 
9. Logic TLRo 
Logic TLRw is an extension of TLR in the same language. 
The AXZOMS of TLRw are: 
theorems of TLR; 
A -+ 0 (A) (for every TLR-formula A). 
The rule of inference of TLRw is Modus Ponens. 
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9.1. Notation. For any TLR-formula A, At denotes the conjunction of all the 
formulas of the form 
(A {a(a): a E M’} A A {O(M, <, cu),: a E (M - M’)}) 
~O(A{~(~):~E~‘}~/\{O(~,~,a),:~E(M-M’)}), 
where O(M, <, a) is a subformula of A and, for the corresponding <I, [M’, <‘I 
is an initial part of [M, <I. 
9.2. Definition. A modal formula A is said to be m-valid iff fA is true for every 
realization J-, 
9.3. Lemma. If there is a finite Visser countermodel for A++ A, then A is not 
w-valid. 
Proof. Assume the condition of the lemma. We may suppose that the model 
(V, R, S, It), defined in 8.1.1, is (at the same time) a countermodel for A++ A 
with not 1 It A+ -+A. Accept also all the other definitions from the proof of 
Lemma 8.1. Clearly Lemmas 8.1.7 and 8.1.9 continue to hold. 
9.3.1. Lemma. For any subformula B of A, 0 It B ifs 1 It B. 
Proof. Induction on the complexity of B. The only nonstraightforward case is 
B = O(Tr) (3). 
Suppose 0 IF O(Tr), where [Tr] = [M, <, a]. Then there is an evaluator 
p :M+ V such that for each a E M, 0 R P(a) (i.e., /3(u) = 1 or 1 R p(u)), 
P(a) IF a(u), and for all a < 6, P(a) S P(b). Observe that for each w E V, if 
0 # w # 1, then, since 1 R W, we have not w S 1 by 6.2.1 and 6.2.4. It follows then 
that one of the following two cases takes place: 
Case 1: there is no a E M with P(a) = 1; 
Case 2: there is an initial part [M’, <‘I of [m, <] such that for each a EM’, 
/3(u) = 1 and for each a E (M - M’), 1 R P(u). 
In the case 1, 1 R /3(a) for each a E M, and clearly 1 It o(Tr). 
Now suppose that the case 2 takes place. Observe that then we have 
(1) 1 Il- C, where 
C = A {a(a): a EM’} A /j {O(M, <, a),: a E (M -M’)}. 
Let us observe now that 1 Ik A+ because not 1 II-A+* A. It follows from this by 
(1) that 
(2) lItO(c). 
Let /3, be the evaluator of M’ such that for each a E M’, P,(u) = C. Using 
several times the axiom 4.2.4b, we have TLR k o(C) + 0(&f’, <‘, pi), whence, 
bY (2) 
(3) 1 It O(M’1 <‘t Pi). 
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Let /I2 be the evaluator of M’ such that for each a E M’, &(a) = a(a) A 
A {O(M, <, (Y)~: b E (M -M’) and b is an immediate successor of a in [M, <I}. 
Clearly for each u E M’, TLR k C+&(u), i.e., TLR t fir(u)+ Pz(u). Therefore, 
by 4.3 and (3), 
(4) 1 IF O(M’, <‘, Pz). 
Let (a,, bi), . . . , (a,, b,) be an enumeration of all the pairs (a, b) such that 
a EM’, b E (M -M’) and b is an immediate successor of a in [M, <I. (Note that 
i #j doesn’t imply uj # Uj). We define the trees [MU, -+), ~1, . . . , [M,, xn, a;l] of 
TLR-formulas by induction: [MO, -$), a01 = [M’, <I, &] and [M,,,, -$+,, cq+J = 
[Mi, <;, a;_] +a,+, [M, <, a]bz+,. By the axiom 4.2.4c, for any 0 G i <n we have: 
TLRl O(M, <i, a;>+ O(Mi+r, <i+i, Lt;+r); 
consequently, by (4), 
(5) 1 II- O(M,, <n, KU,). 
Let us now observe that [M,, K~] = [M, <I. Observe also that for each a EM, 
(Y(U) is a conjunct of an(u) (namely, for each a E (M -M’), a,,(a) = a(a) and for 
each a E M’, a,(a) equals to flz(u) and the latter contains cr(u) as a conjunct). 
Therefore, by 4.3, TLRt O(Mn, xn, cu,)-+ O(M, <, a), whence, by (5), 1 It 
O(M, <, a). 9.3.1 is thus proved. 0 
9.3.2. Lemma. For any subformula B of A, 
(a) ifOItB, then PAt-L,+fB; 
(b) if not 0 I!- B, then PA t &,+lfB. 
Proof. Induction on the complexity of B. The only case when the reasoning 
differs from that given in the proof of Lemma 81.9, is B = O(T~) (b). 
Suppose not 0 II- O(Tr), where [Tr] = [M, X, a]. Let us first verify the 
following proposition: 
(*) Suppose an evaluator /3: M + V is such that for each a EM, /?(a) I\ a(a). 
Then there are a < b with not P(a) S P(b). 
Indeed, assume the conditions of (*), and suppose, for a contradiction, that for 
all a <b, P(a) S P(b). Let then /?’ be the evaluator of M such th? for each 
a EM, /?‘(a) = 1, if /?(a) = 0, and /3’(u) = /3(a) otherwise. Then 0 R P’(u) for all 
a E M. By 9.3.1, for each a E M, /3’(u) It (Y(U); on the other hand, it cau be easily 
verified that for each a <b, P’(u) S/3’(b) (take into account that, by 5.2.1, and 
5.2.4, w # 0 implies not w S 0). It means that 0 IF O(Tr), a contradiction. 
Let E be the evaluator of m such that for each a E M, 
&(a) = v {L,: z.4 It U(U)}. 
Argue in PA. It follows from 8.1.7a, 8.1.9 and the induction hypothesis that for 
each a E M, PA t fcx(u)+ E(U); it means that the theory f<(a) contains the theory 
E(u). 
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Suppose fV(Tr) is true, i.e., (M, -c,~N) is IT,-consistent; then, since $$a) 
contains E(u) for all a EM, (M, <, E) is III-consistent, too. By 4.4 (taking into 
account the arithmetical soundness of TLR), this is possible only if (M, i, EJ is 
II,-consistent for some evaluator c1 of M such that for each a E M, E,(U) is a 
disjunct of ~(a), i.e., cl(u) = L, for some u with u It a(u). Let e2 be the evaluator 
of M that assigns to each a E M the very u for which E,(U) = L,. By (*), we have 
not E*(U) S I* for some a -C b, whence, by 8.1.7d, (E,(u), E,(b)) is IZ,- 
inconsistent, whence, by the axiom 4.2.4a (in view of the arithmetical soundness 
of TLR), (M, <, Z1) is III-inconsistent, a contradiction. We conclude that (M, <, - 
for) is IZ,-inconsistent, i.e., ifC)(Tr). 0 
We can now complete the proof of Lemma 9.3. Since not 1 ItA+-+A, we have 
not 1 IIA, whence, by 9.3.1, not OIlA, whence, by 9.3.2, PAt Lo+~fA; and 
since L, is true, fA is false. 0 
9.4. Theorem. TLRc(, I- A #A is o-valid. 
Proof. (3): All theorems of TLR are w-valid because they are PA-valid (7.5); 
the axiom A + C) (A) is obviously o-valid, too, and Modus Ponens clearly 
preserves o-validity. 
(+): By 6.4a(e), 9.3 and the evident fact that TLRw YA implies 
TLRXA++A. Cl 
9.5. Remark. As we noted in the above paragraph, TLRw XA implies 
TLRYA+ -+A. On the other hand, by 6.4a(+), 9.3 and 9.4(j), TLRYA++A 
implies TLRoXA. Thus, TLRwIAeTLRtA++A and, since TLR is de- 
cidable (6.5), TLRw is decidable, too. 
10. TLR and provability logic with propositional quantifiers 
The language of provability logic contains, besides the symbols used in classical 
logic, the unary modal operator 0. Formulas of this language are considered as 
schemata of arithmetical formulas, where CIA is understood as a formalization of 
the assertion “A is provable (say, in PA)“. Under this approach there arise two 
natural classes of modal formulas: 
(1) class P of the modal formulas that are schemata of PA-provable arithmeti- 
cal formulas, and 
(2) class T of the modal formulas that are schemata of true arithmetical 
formulas. 
And the main task is to characterize these two classes - first and foremost, to 
determine their arithmetical complexities. 
The answer on this main question depends on what language is taken as the 
basic one to which the modal operator 0 is added. 
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If the basic language is that of propositional logic (without quantifiers), 
everything is ‘smooth’: as it was shown by Solovay [14], both sets P and T are 
decidable. But if the language of predicate logic is taken as the basic one, the 
situation deteriorates at once: Vardanyan [16] showed that in this case the set P is 
not r.e., and before that Artemov [l] showed that the set T is not even 
arithmetical. 
A different approach is taking the basic language to be a propositional language 
with quantifiers over propositions. There are several natural ways of doing this, 
and we do not know whether any of them leads to undecidability of P or T. 
Moreover, up to now there are not known any results concerning decidability of 
more or less considerable fragments of provability logic (i.e., the sets P and T) 
with propositional quantifiers, when the range of the latters is not restricted to 
some very specific class of arithmetical formulas. Theorem 10.6 below can be 
regarded as the first positive result of this kind. 
Studying provability logic with propositional quantifiers, some restrictions or 
conditions are necessary to be taken. E.g., the formula q (Vp (Up-p)) hardly 
can have any reasonable interpretation, if ‘Vp’ is understpod as ‘for any 
arithmetical formula p’, because in this case the expression ‘Vp (Clp 3~)’ has no 
natural translation into arithmetic. This difficulty will be avoided, if the 
propositional variables range over arithmetical formulas of restricted complexity. 
Below we define a language, the quantifiers of which are interpreted as 
quantifiers over Z:,-sentences - the most interesting class of arithmetical 
formulas. 
In language L, besides T and I, we have two sorts of atomic formulas: 
(1) propositional letters: pl, p2, . . . ; as we see, the set of propositional letters 
of L coincides with that of the language of TLR; 
(2) propositional variables that we denote by x, y, z, x1, x2, . . . , y,, y,, . . . . 
We suppose that the set of propositional variables of L coincides with the set of 
individual variables of PA. 
10.1. Definition. The set of formulas of L (L-formulas) is defined as the smallest 
one such that: 
(1) propositional letters, propositional variables, T and I are L-formulas; 
(2) Boolean combinations of L-formulas are L-formulas; 
(3) if A is an L-formula, then CIA is an L-formula; 
(4) if A is an L-formula and x is a propositional variable, then VxA is an 
L-formula. 
10.2. Notation. For any arithmetical formula E, Pr[E] is an r.e. arithmetical 
formula with exactly the same free variables that naturally expresses the 
PA-provability of the result of substituting for each variable free in E the numeral 
for the value of that variable (cf. [3]). 
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Recall also that 3y O(y, x) is a formalization of the predicate “x is the Godel 
number of a true Z,!-sentence” (2.7). 
10.3. Definition. A realization, as in case of the lagnuage of TLR, is a function f 
that assigns to each propositional letter pi a sentence fpi of PA. f is extended to 
complex L-formulas in the following unique way: 
(a) for any propositional variable X, fx = 3y O(y, x); 
(b) f commutes with Boolean connectives; 
(c) f(V.x A) = Vx (f-4); 
(d) 00-4) = WAI. 
We say that an L-formula is pure, if it doesn’t contain propositional letters (but 
it may contain propositional variables). Notice that if A is a pure L-formula, then 
fA doesn’t depend on the choice of the realization fi 
10.4. Problems. 1. What are the arithmetical complexities of the sets of closed 
L-formulas 
P = {A: PA IfA for every realization f} and 
T = {A: fA is true for every realization f}? 
2. What are the complexities of the above sets restricted to pure formulas? 
We are now going to define a fragment L’ of L and show, that formulas of L’ 
are ‘expressible’ in the language of TLR; it implies the decidability of the 
restrictions of P and T to L’-formulas. 
10.5. Definition. The set of L’-formulas is defined as the smallest one such that: 
(1) propositional letters, T and I are L’-formulas; 
(2) Boolean combinations of L’-formulas are L’-formulas; 
(3) if A=A,, . . . , A,, are L’-formulas, x =x1, . . . , x,, y = y,, . . . , yk are 
propositional variables (possibly n, m, k = 0) and Bl(A, x, y) is a Boolean 
combination of A, x, y, then 3x Vy q BZ(A, x, y) is an L’-formula. 
2.5 shows that, roughly speaking, in L’ can be expressed everything expressible 
in the language of TLR. E.g., O(pI, p2) can be expressed by 1% q l((p,+ 
lx) A (pl+x)). The following theorem establishes that such an ‘expressibility’ 
holds in the opposite direction as well: 
10.6. Theorem. There is an effective mapping * that assigns to every L’-formula A 
a TLR-formula A* containing exactly the same propositional letters such that for 
every realization f, 
PA tfA ++fA*. 
To prove this theorem, we need two Lemmas 10.7 and 10.8. 
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10.7. Lemma. Let z, x =x1, . . . , x,, y = y,, . . . , y, be propositional variables 
(possibly m, k=O), A=A ,,..., A,, be L’-formulas (possibly n = 0), and 
Bl(A, x, y, z) be a Boolean combination of A, x, y, z. Then for any realization f, 
PA t-f 3x Vy Vz q Bl(A, x, y, z) e f 3x Vy q (Bl)(A, x, y, T) A 
WA, x> Y, I)). 
Proof. It is enough to show that PA t F tf E, where 
F = f Vz q Bl(A, x, y, z) and E = f q (Bl(A, x, y, T) A Bl(A, x, y, I)). 
Since T, I E E,, the fact PA F F --f E is evident. Now, it is easy to see that 
PAt- E+fO((z+ Bl(A, x, y, z)) A (lz E Bl(A, x, y, z))), 
whence 
PAF E+fO((r v lz)+ Bl(A, x, y, z)), 
whence 
PAtE+f(O(z v~z)*UBl(A,x,y, z)), 
whence 
i.e. 
PAk E-+f(Vz q (z v lz)--tVz q Bl(A, x, y, z)), 
PAtE+(f Vz q (z vlz)+F). 
But PA 1 f Vz q (z v 1~). Consequently, PA t E + F. 0 
10.8. Lemma. Suppose N = { 1, . . . , n} and M is the set of all linearly ordered 
subsets of N (i.e., sequences (k,, . . . , k,) (possibly m = 0) such that for each 
lcism, kjEN and if j#i, then ki#kj). For all a, bEM, let a<b iff b is a 
proper end-extension of a (2.1.8). Notice that [M, <] is a tree and ROOT[M, 41 is 
the empty sequence ( ). For each a E M, let a0 be the very subset of N that is 
linearly ordered in a. Let a be an evaluator of M that assigns to each a E M some 
superarithmetical theory, such that if a0 = b”, then a(a) = a(b). Then PA proves 
the equivalence of the assertions (i) and (ii): 
(i) (M, <, a) is III-inconsistent; 
(ii) there are x1, . . . , x, E E,! such that for each a E M, we have: 
(1) a(a) kl(A{xj: i E a”} A A {lxi; i E (N - a’)}). 
Proof. Argue in PA. 
(ii) j (i): Assume (ii). Taking 2.5 into account, it is enough to show that for 
each a E M, 
(2) a(a) k A {lA {xi: i E b”}: a < b}+ll\ {xi: i E a”}. 
Consider an arbitrary a E M. 
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If each 1 c i s it is in a”, then (2) immediately follows from (1). 
Otherwise, let us consider any 1 pi 4 n with i $ a”. Let b be the result of 
adding i as the last element to the sequence a. We have a < b and 
(*) PAtxi~/1\{~~:i~~~}~/\{~j:j~b’}. 
Thus, for any i E (N - a’) there is b with a -C b such that (*) is satisfied. It means 
that we have 
i.e., by contraposition, 
PA t /j {l/j {x;: i E b”}: a < b} +1/j {xi: i E a’} v /j {TX;: i E (N - a’)}. 
Now, (2) easily follows from this and (1) by propositional logic. 
(i)+ (ii): Assume (i). It means by 2.5 that for each a E M there is a 
_X,-sentence F, such that PA l- F( ) and 
cu(a)t/j{~Fh:uib}+~F,. 
For each a E M, let F: be a E,!-sentence that is PA-equivalent to V {Fb: b” = 
a’}. Taking into account that u” = b” implies a(u) = w(b), it is easy to verify that 
for each a E M, 
(3) a(a) t /j {lF,+: u” c b”} + lF,+ 
(recall: u” c b” means that u” E b” and a0 # b”). 
We may suppose that the sentences FL are chosen in such a way that if a” # b”, 
then F,+ # Fl and so PA proves that F,+ and FL cannot have common regular 
witnesses (recall 2.7). 
Let us define a p.r. function g: o-+ {a’: a EM} as follows: g(0) = 0 and 
g(k + ‘) = (i(k), 
if a E M, g(k) c a” and k is a regular witness for F:; 
if such an u” doesn’t exist. 
Let now for each 1 c i s IZ, xi be a X,!-sentence expressing that i E g(k) for 
some k. We want to show that then (1) holds. 
First of all let us observe that (PA proves that) the function g has a limit; let 
Lim denote this limit. It is easy to see that each xi is PA-equivalent to the 
assertion that i E Lim. It follows that for each a E M, 
(4) A {xi: i E d} A A {IXi: i E (M - d)} is PA-equivalent to Lim = a”; 
on the other hand, it is also easy to verify that 
(5) Lim = a0 implies in PA A {lFb+: dc b”} A FT. 
Now, (1) follows from (3), (4) and (5). q 
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Proof of Theorem 10.6. We define A* by induction on the complexity of A. 
If A is a propositional letter, T or I, set A* = A; if A = (B+ C), set 
A* = (B*+ C*); similarly for the other Boolean connectives. 
Suppose now A = 3x Vy KlBl(B, x, y), where B = B,, . . . , Bk are L’-formulas, 
x=x1 )...) -&,y=yi )...) y, are propositional variables (possibly k, n, m = 0), 
and BZ(B, x, y) is a Boolean combination of B, x, y. 
First we use Lemma 10.7 m times and obtain an L’-formula 3x LIBII(B, x), 
where Bl, is a Boolean combination of B, x and for any realization f, 
(1) PA tfA ++f 3x q Bl,(B, n). 
LetN={l,..., n}, K=(l)..., k}, S be the set of all subsets of N and U be 
the set of all subsets of K. For each s E S and u E U, let 
s=/\{Xi:iES}A~{lXi:iE(N-s)} and 
ti = A {Bi: i E u} A /j {lBi: i E (K-u)}. 
Now, by propositional logic, there is a Boolean combination B12 of B, x that is 
a conjunction, each conjunct of which is Li--,+ for some s E S and u E U, such 
that Bl,(B, x) is tautologically equivalent to BII(B, x). 
Let for each s E S, R, be the disjunction of all fi such that a++ is a conjunct 
of B&(B, x). Then A {R, +3: s E S} is tautologically equivalent to Bl,(B, x). 
Thus for any realization f, 
(2) PAtf3x BI,(B,x)t,f3xO(~{R,-,ls^:s ES}). 
For each a E M, let a” be the very subset of N that is linearly ordered in a. 
In the following three paragraphs we define a tree [M, <, a] of TLR-formulas 
Let M be the set of all linearly ordered subsets of N. 
For all a, 6 E M, let a < b iff b is a proper end-extension of a. 
By the induction hypothesis, BT is already defined for each Bi (1 s i =S k). Each 
R, (s E S) is a Boolean combination of B,, . . . , Bk, and, since * commutes with 
Boolean connectives, R: is also defined. Taking this remark into account, let CY 
be the evaluator of M which assigns to each a E M the TLR-formula R:, where 
s = u”. 
Now, we define A* by setting A* =lO(M, <, a). 
We want to show that for every realization f, 
(3) PA tf 3x q (A {R,++: s E S}) ++fA*. 
Let us fix a realization f and argue in PA. f 3x q l(A {R,-,+: s E S}) means 
that there are Z:,!-sentences x = xi, . . _ , x, such that for each s E S, PA tfR,+ 
3; on the other hand, the induction hypothesis implies that PA EfRs *fR:; it 
means that for each s E S, PA + fR,T I+, and this, by Lemma 10.8, is equivalent 
to the assertion that (M, <, F) is f17,-inconsistent (recall notations 7.1.1 and 
7.1.4). Thus, f 3x0(/\ {R, +-S: s ES}) iff (M, <, f<) is IIT,-inconsistent. But 
“(M, <,G) is U i-inconsistent” means nothing else but that fA* is true. Thus, (3) 
holds. 
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It follows from (l), (2) and (3) that for every realization f, PA kfA -fA*. 
Finally, let us observe that A* contains exactly the same propositional letters as A 
and that the mapping * is effective. This completes the proof of Theorem 
10.6. 0 
Appendix A 
Notes on some logics between GL and TLR 
For background information, we define the three logics that are between GL 
and TLR in Figure 2, see Introduction. 
The axioms of logic HGL- (the 0, ,X,-fragment of the logic of arithmetical 
hierarchy, [5]) are given by the following schemata: 
0. tautologies; 
1. q (A+B)-+(ClA-,OB); 
2. q (OA+A)-+ CIA; 
3. 2, A A Z,B-+ &(A A B) A X1(A v B); 
4. Z,A A IJ(A*B)-&B; 
5. &A + q lZ,A; 
6. ,X11; 
7. Z,OA; 
8. Z,E,A; 
9. Z,A -+ q (A + DA). 
The rules of inference are Modus Ponens and t A 3 t q iA. 
The axiom schemata of Ignatiev’s [lo] logic ELH (the logic of Zr- 
interpolability) are: 
0. tautologies; 
1. q (A+ B)+ (OA+ q B); 
2. q (OA+A)- DA; 
3. A+B-+(A A C)+B; 
4. A++B A C++B+(A v C)-wB; 
5. A++B-+A+(B v C); 
6. A++BAA+C-A+(BAC); 
7. q (A+B) A B+eC+A++C; 
8. A-++B A q (B+C)+A+C; 
9. -L++L; 
lo. T+T; 
11. A++B+U(A++B); 
12. (A+B)++(A+B); 
13. (A ++ B)+ q (A + B); 
14. (A+B)- q (A-+ q B). 
The rules of inference are Modus Ponens and t A + 1 CIA. 
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The axiom schemata of logic TOL (the logic of linear tolerance, [6]) are: 
0. tautologies; 
I. O(C A, D)+ o(C, A A lB, 0) v O(C, B, D); 
2. O(A)-+ O(A * %A)); 
3. O(C, A, D)-+ o(C, D); 
4. O(C, A, D)-+ o(C, A, A, D); 
5, O(A, O(C))+ o(A * O(C)); 
6. O(C O(~))-+ O(C D). 
(A abbreviates AI, . . . , A, for any II 2 0; if n = 0, O(A) is identified with T.) 
The rules of inference are Modus Ponens and 1A k?)A. 
We see that TOL has a simpler axiomatization than ELH. This is one more 
argument showing that the non-generalized, binary relation of weak inter- 
pretability is not quite natural. 
In view of the interpretations of the logics TLR, TOL, ELH and GL and the 
corresponding arithmetical completeness theorems, we can say that TOL, ELH 
and GL are the ‘linear’, the ‘binary’ and the ‘unary’ fragments of TLR, 
respectively. 
In particular, define a translation * from the languages of the logics GL, 
HGL-, ELH and TOL into the language of TLR by: 
* commutes with Boolean connectives; 
(OA)* =lO(lA); 
(&A)* = ?)(A, 1A); 
(A+B)* =lO(A, 1B); 
O(A)* = O(A). 
Then, if L is one of these four logics and A is a formula of the language of L, 
we have: 
LkA iff TLRtA*. 
Modulo the arithmetical completeness theorem, the following proposition 
implies that tolerance, in general, cannot be modal-logically defined in terms of 
linear tolerance and hence, TLR is an essential extension of TOL: 
Proposition. Let Tr = [M, -=c, (~1, where: 
M = {1,2, 3); 
-=C = {(I, 2), (1, 3)); 
a(i) = pi (aZl i E M). 
Then for any formula A of the language of TOL, 
not TLRkA* t, O(Tr). 
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Fig. 3. 
Indeed, consider the two strengthened Visser models displayed in Fig. 3, where 
each world forces only the indicated propositional letters (the S-arrows are also 
supposed to be reflexive). 
It is easy to see that both models force precisely the same formulas of the 
language of TLR at the world w whereas we have w It O(Tr) in the first model and 
not w It O(7’r) in the other one. In view of the soundness of TLR with respect to 
Visser models, it follows that for no formula A of the language of TOL do we 
have TLRtA*++O(Tr). 
A similar method can be used to prove that each logic between GL and TLR in 
Figure 2 is an essential extension of its predecessors. 
Appendix B 
Proof of Theorem 3.6b 
In the following T and S are superarithmetical theories. By a ‘translation’ we 
mean a translation from the language of PA into the language of PA. A 
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‘cointerpretation of S in T’ means a translation that satisfies 3.3b. PC is pure 
predicate calculus. Notation and terminology not explained here are standard (cf. 
[71, [lllb 
The following Lemmas B. 1 and B.2 can be called variants of Lindstrom’s [ll] 
Lemmas 2 and 4, respectively: 
B.l. Lemma. There is a formula a(x) such that: 
(i) a(x) binumerates T (i.e., the set of axioms of T) in S; 
(ii) if S !- PrU( rE1), then S t Pr, 1 ,J rE1) for some m (all E). 
B.2. Lemma. Suppose (u(x) binumerates T in S + Con,. There is then a 
translation t such that for all E, 
if S + Con, 1 tE, then S + Con, 1 Pra( rE1 ). 
B.3. Lemma. There is a translation t such that for all E, 
if S I- tE, then S 1 Pr, p ,( rE1) for some m. 
Proof. Let us fix the formula (T(X) from Lemma B.l. According to (i), a(x) 
binumerates T in S and hence in S + Con,. Then, by Lemma B.2, there is a 
translation t such that for all E, 
(*) if S + Con, 1 tE, then S + Con, t PrJ rE1). 
Suppose S t tE. Then S + Con, 1 tE and, by (*), S + Con, t PrO( rE1); on the 
other hand, we clearly have S + Xon, t Pr,( rE1); consequently, S t PrO( IE1 ). 
Then, by B.l(ii), S t Pr, 1 ,J rE1) for some m. Cl 
B.4. Lemma. Let E be a sentence and t be a translation with the relativizing 
formula 6(x) (see 3.1). Then 
Proof. Standard. Argue in PA. 
Suppose Prf is a proof of E in pure predicate calculus, and let x1, . . . , x, be all 
the variables occurring free in Prf. Let then 
A = 6(x,) A . . . A 6(x,). 
By induction on Prf, one can easily verify that PC I- A+ tE and hence (as E is 
closed) PC I- 3A+ tE (34 denotes the existential quantifiers closure of A). On 
the other hand, PC 13~ 6(x)-, 34. Consequently, PC I- 3x 6(x)+ tE. cl 
B.5. Theorem. The following are equivalent: 
(i) S is cointerpretable in T. 
(ii) Zf S 1 PrT I ,J rE1) for some m, then T 1 E (all E). 
(iii) S is _Z,-conservative over T. 
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Proof. (i) + (ii): Suppose t (with the relativizing formula 6(x)) is a cointerpreta- 
tion of S in T, and S k Pr, 1 ,J k’ ), i.e., S t PrB( ‘/j T r m + E’ ). Then, by B.4, 
S k PrB( ‘3~ 6(n)+ t(A T 1 m + E)‘) and, since S is essentially reflexive, 
,StElx6(x)-+t(l\ T rrn+-E), whence Stt(ilx(x=x)-+(l\T lrn-E)), 
whence (as t is a cointerpretation of S in T) T t 3x (x = x) + (A T r m + E), 
whence T t E. 
(ii)+(i): Assume (ii). Let t be the translation from B.3. Suppose S 1 tE. Then, 
by B.3, StPr,r,(rE1) f or some m, whence, by (ii), T k E. It means that t is a 
cointerpretation of S in T. 
(ii)+ (iii): Assume (ii). Suppose E is a X,-sentence and S k E. Then 
StPr,,,(‘E’) f or some ‘sufficiently large’ m, whence, by (ii), T 1 E. 
(iii) 3 (ii): Supp ose S is Zi-conservative over T and S t- Pr, r ,( rE1). Since 
PrT 1 ,A ‘El 1 is a Xi-sentence, it follows that T t Pr, rm( rE1) and, T being 
essentially reflexive, T 1 E. 
The theorem is proved. q 
Observe that the above proof can be formalized in PA, and Theorem 3.6b is 
thus the (i)e(iii) part of B.5. 
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